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China is a rising global power with a growing role and impact on the world’s energy markets 
as well as on the Earth’s climate system. China pursues its development in an essentially 
non-confrontational manner, a vision encapsulated by the notion of peaceful rise which is 
viewed positively in the world’s major capitals. Nevertheless, China’s rapid growth represents 
a genuine global challenge and raises many questions. How is China dealing with its growing 
need for imported crude oil? What is the impact of China’s rise on the global oil market, 
notably in terms of oil price developments? Are Chinese actions on oil markets different from 
those of other major importers? What opportunities and risks arise as a result of China’s 
growing role on the global oil market from the viewpoint of other global players? In this report 
we  seek  to  offer  some  answers  to  those  questions  with  a  review  of  China’s  developing 
energy policy, of the actions and revealed preferences of its national oil companies, and of 
broader economic and geopolitical analyses of the impact of China’s growing oil consumption 
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China  was  self-sufficient  in  oil  until  the  early  1990s.  However  her  impressive  economic 
growth is fuelling a boom in energy consumption in general and in transportation needs in 
particular.  This  should  lead  to  a  large  increase  in  demand  for  petroleum  products  while 
domestic  oil  supply  is  expected  to  stabilise  and  then  decline  slightly  over  the  next  two 
decades.  As  a  result,  China’s  demand  for  imported  oil  and  therefore  its  role  on  the 
international  oil  market  is  expected  to  rise  substantially.  According  to  the  IEA’s  2009 
Reference Scenario (see IEA, 2009), China’s oil consumption would more than double in the 
medium-term,  from  7.7  million  barrels  per  day  (mb/d)  in  2008  to  16.3  mb/d  in  2030. 
Concurrently IEA (2009) projects that China’s domestic oil production will fall from 3.8 mb/d 
in 2008 to 3.2 mb/d in 2030. As a result, the country’s net import needs would sky-rocket, 
from 3.9 mb/d in 2008 to 13.1 mb/d, making China the world’s largest net importer of crude 
oil by 2030, slightly ahead of the United States (13.5 mb/d in 2008, 12.7 mb/d in 2030). 
 
From the Chinese perspective this means moving from a net import dependence ratio of 51% 
in 2008 to 80% in 2030. As a comparison, the United States is expected to remain in a range 
of 73%-74% up to 2030, while OECD Europe
2 is expected to move from a dependence ratio 
of 70% in 2008 to 88% by 2030, essentially due to falling North Sea production. For the 
global oil market, China’s rise means that the world will have three large importers by 2030 
(China, the US and the EU) rather than just the latter two currently.  
 
China is therefore set to become quite vulnerable, both to oil price shocks and to physical 
disruptions. Oil security concerns that the United States (and Europe) know only too well are 
therefore  expected  to  become  important  preoccupations  for  Chinese  policy-makers.  How 
China  deals  with  those  concerns  is  crucial  for  her  development  and  for  her  economic 
security. It is also bound to impact other major consumers, as well as producers, and could 
lead to a range of re-alignments in economic and security relations in many world regions. 
 
China’s de facto foreign oil policy is formulated at the intersection of China’s broader energy 
policy and of China’s broader foreign policy. Additionally, other policy areas and programmes 
have  an  important  influence,  notably  China’s  ‘go  abroad’  policy,  as  well  as  the  country’s 
environmental, industrial, and fiscal policies. Accordingly, many actors are involved in the 
policy  making  process,  with  the  big  national  oil  companies  taking  a  prominent  role.  In  a 
                                                 
2 The sum  for the  following  group of countries:  Austria,  Belgium, the  Czech  Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France,  Germany,  Greece,  Hungary,  Iceland,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands,  Norway,  Poland, 
Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom.  
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general  sense,  the  overlaps  between  policy  areas  found  in  the  case  of  China  are  not 
fundamentally different from those found in many other countries, though there are some 
noticeable structural differences especially as compared to Western countries. In particular, 
the main corporate players on the Chinese side are state-owned, while in the case of both 
the EU and the USA the key players are privately-owned (if state-influenced) companies. In 
terms of upstream investment, Chinese companies have been very active in recent years in 
many regions of the world. In addition, Chinese upstream investments have on a number of 
occasions been components of broader bilateral cooperation agreements. The recent flurry 
of oil exploration deals has led some observers to question China’s priorities and strategies, 
and to assess the extent to which China and the West might be heading for zero-sum (or 
even  negative  sum)  competition.  Other  observers  have  stressed  a  broader  observation, 
namely that China is naturally and perhaps inevitably creating or strengthening bilateral ties 
with many countries across the world as any other rising power would. Whether this should 
necessarily lead to clashes with other powers would then be a matter of deliberate choice for 
world leaders. In any case, China’s stated preference for a peaceful rise should be seen as a 
positive signal that this need not necessarily be the case. Finally, China’s declared interest in 
long-term supply contracts coincides with recent demands from oil producing countries for 
changes  in  how  oil  is  traded  and  priced,  leading  some  analysts  to  predict  a  partial 
fragmentation or regionalisation of the world’s oil market.  
 
This report is made up of four chapters. The first chapter provides a detailed overview of 
China’s energy needs, of its domestic energy policy debate and of the foreign investments of 
its National Oil Companies (NOCs). In the second chapter we present the results of a global 
trade model simulation in order to highlight the impact of China’s growing role for the world 
economy in general and for global oil prices in particular. In the third chapter we provide a 
more formal discussion on oil price formation and on selected economic aspects of China’s 
interventions on the global oil market. In the fourth and final chapter, a conceptual framework 
for assessing the oil security position of a net importer of oil is developed and then applied to 
the case of China.  
 
The  report  ends  with  concluding  remarks  and  some  general  policy  suggestions  for  EU 
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Chapter 1 – Genesis and Deployment 
 
1.1 Domestic environment  
Overall energy supply and demand 
Since the beginning of the economic reforms in 1978, China’s economy has expanded at a 
spectacular average annual growth rate of nearly 10%. Energy consumption has expanded 
fast as well, but the growth rate of energy consumption (in real terms) remained well below 
the growth rate of GDP until 2002 (see Figure 1.1). Between 1980 and the late 1990s, GDP 
quadrupled  but  energy  consumption  only  doubled  thanks  to  a  massive  shift  of  Chinese 
industry  from  heavy  to  light  industries  (e.g.  textiles,  leather,  electronics)  and  to  gains  in 
energy efficiency. Accordingly, the energy elasticity of GDP stayed below one until that year, 
but fluctuated significantly (see Figure 1.2). However, to reach the current target of China’s 
development plan ‘to quadruple GDP while only doubling energy between 2000 and 2020’, 
the energy elasticity of GDP would have to remain around 0.3 for the rest of the period 
(Sinton, 2005, p.3). The amount of energy used to generate one unit of GDP fell significantly 
from 3.4 tons of coal equivalent (tce) per 10,000 yuan GDP (at constant prices 2005) in 1980 
to 1.2 in 2007 (In 2002 a minimum was reached of 1.1 tce per 10,000 yuan); see Figure 1.3. 
But this level is still 2.5 times the world average and 7.2 times the value in Japan (Chinese 

















Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2008, Tables 6-8, and Sinton (2005)  
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Figure 1.2 
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2008  
 
China’s  major  source  of  energy  is  coal,  covering  about  70%  of  consumption.  Crude  oil 
accounts for a relatively small share in China’s energy mix (Figures 1.4a and 1.4b). But while 
the relative importance of crude oil in primary energy consumption is fairly stable, domestic 
production does not keep pace. Crude oil made up about 20% of energy consumption in  
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1980 and in 2007, but the share of crude oil in energy production fell from 24% in 1980 to 
11% in 2007 as oil production in China becomes more challenging and more costly.  
 
Figure 1.4 
Components of energy production and consumption in China 
Figure 1.4a: Energy production 
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Figure 1.4b: Energy consumption 
  Shares in total energy consumption 1980, in %  Shares in total energy consumption 2007, in % 
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2008 
 
Chinese oil demand exceeded supply for the first time in 1993 (Figure 1.5) with the balance 
to be imported. Chinese oil imports have risen significantly, reaching 257 Mtce (179 Mtoe) in 
2007 (Table 1.1). The share of imports in domestic oil consumption reached 50% in 2007.  
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Nevertheless, per capita oil consumption in China is still only one half of the world average 
while per capita oil imports come up to one quarter of the world’s average. 
 
Figure 1.5 
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2008 
 
Table 1.1  
Basic data on China’s energy demand and supply, 1990, 2000 and 2007 
   1990  2000  2007 
Total energy production, 10,000 tce  103,922  128,978  235,445 
Total energy consumption, 10,000 tce  98,703  138,553  265,583 
Crude oil production, 10,000 tce  19,745  23,281  26,605 
Crude oil consumption, 10,000 tce  16,385  32,158  52,320 
Crude oil balance (prod.-cons.),10,000 tce  3,360  -8,878  -25,715 
Share of crude oil balance in crude oil consumption, in %  20.5  -27.6  -49.1 
GDP (at constant prices 2005), in 100 mio yuan    42,982  115,948  228,803 
Total energy elasticity of GDP  0.47  0.42  0.66 
Total energy consumption per 10,000 yuan of GDP   2.30  1.19  1.16 
Total energy consumption per capita, tce  0.86  1.09  2.01 
Oil consumption per capita, tce   0.14  0.25  0.40 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2008, Sinton (2005), Development Research Center, own calculations 
 
China’s  rising  demand  for  crude  oil  is  driven  by  the  over-proportionate  consumption  of 
petroleum products for transportation and to a smaller extent for construction and residential 
activities. In absolute terms, consumption of petroleum products for transportation increased 
more than threefold between 1990 and 2000 and more than two-fold again from 2000 to 
2007. The major reasons behind this development are increasing urbanisation, higher per 
capita incomes and a corresponding growth in the private vehicle fleet. Between 1990 and 
2007,  China’s  total  urban  population  doubled  from  300  million  to  600  million,  per  capita  
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income (at constant prices 1995) more than quadrupled, and the number of passenger cars 
increased from 1.6 million to 32 million (China Statistical Yearbook 2008).  
 
Future development of China’s energy demand and supply 
In 2003 the Development Research Center of the State Council assembled leading energy 
research institutes in China in order to recommend a long-term energy strategy and policy for 
the country. The resulting ‘National Energy Strategy and Policy 2020’ (DRC, 2004) is the first 
of its kind in China. One major finding of that report is that China should be able to keep 
energy  demand  growth  at  a  relatively  low  rate  for  the  next  20  years  if  the  right  energy 
strategies and related policies and measures are taken. The relevant policy target is that 
energy demand should only double between 2000 and 2020 while GDP would grow four-fold. 
According to the central projection (Scenario B in Table 1.2), energy demand in China would 
reach  2021  Mtoe  in  2020.  Final  consumption  of  oil  would  reach  554  Mtoe.  Domestic  oil 
production is expected to stay at the current level of around 180 million tons per annum. 
Output in the old eastern oilfields has been dropping over the years, while increased output 
in north-western and central regions (mainly from the Ordos Basin) has roughly made up for 
the decrease in eastern regions. Further compensating increases in output could come from 
coastal regions as well
3. In light of future trends, it is estimated that China will experience a 
petroleum output peak around 2015 with maximum output possibly reaching 200 Mtoe
4.  
In a ‘Business as Usual Scenario’, with no new policy measures taken to mitigate energy 
demand (Scenario A in Table 1.2), oil imports would reach 453 Mtoe in 2020 (72% of total 
consumption). In the most optimistic Scenario (Scenario C in Table 1.2), on the other hand, 
stronger policy adjustments would occur, leading to a strong mitigation of demand growth.  
All in all, DRC (2004) foresees China’s net oil import volume in a range of 174 – 228 Mtoe for 
2010 (central projection: 218), and in a range of 287 – 453 Mtoe for 2020 (central projection: 
396). Correspondingly, China’s import dependence should be in a range of 49% - 56% in 
2010, and in a range of 61% - 72% in 2020. 
Those  projections  are  more-or-less  in  line  with  recent  projections  from  the  IEA’s  World 
Energy Outlook 2009. The two scenarios presented in IEA (2009) are also shown in Table 
1.2 for purposes of comparison, as well as in order to present projections for 2030. The IEA’s 
Reference Scenario is a kind of ‘business-as-usual’ scenario that takes into account policies 
enacted until mid-2009. Interestingly, the projections from that scenario are quite close to 
those of Scenario B from DRC (2004). On the other hand, the IEA’s 450 Scenario assumes 
that bold action is taken globally in order to stabilise the atmospheric concentration of CO2 at 
                                                 
3 Some offshore resources could become viable depending on price developments. In addition, China has some 
potential in terms of shale oil. The scenarios discussed here do not take those possible resources into account. 
4 DRC (2004), English Summary Report, p. 13.  
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450  parts  per  million.  The  450  Scenario  yields  consumption  and  import  levels  that  are 
substantially higher than those of Scenario C from DRC (2004), suggesting that the latter 
may be very difficult to achieve. Lastly, IEA (2009) foresees a slow decline in China’s oil 
production over 2015-2030. As a result, IEA (2009) implicitly foresees an import dependence 
ratio in a range of 76% to 79% for 2030
5.  
 
Table 1.2  
China’s oil balance and net imports, scenario projections (2010-2030) 
 
DRC (2004)  IEA (2009) 
 
Scenario A  Scenario B  Scenario C  Ref. Scenario  450 Scenario 
   2010  2020  2010  2020  2010  2020  2020  2030  2020  2030 
Total final consumption, 
all energy products 
1489  2286  1441  2021  1296  1719  1910  2353  1795  1924 
Total final consumption, 
oil and oil products 
375  611  365  554  321  445  524  736  494  636 
Non-final  consumption, 
oil and oil products (1) 
33  22  33  22  33  22  33  22  28  28 
Oil production (2)  180  180  180  180  180  180  183  162  183  162 
Net imports  228  453  218  396  174  287  374  596  339  502 
Import dep. ratio (%)  56  72  55  69  49  61  67  79  65  76 
 
Source: DRC (2004), IEA (2009) and author calculations. 
(1) IEA (2009) Reference Scenario values are assumed for the NESP (2004) scenarios 
(2) For the IEA scenarios, IEA (2009) data in mb/d was taken and converted into Mtoe 
 
In August 2009, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) released the ‘Chinese Energy 
Development  Plan’  which  elaborates  various  options  for  the  development  of  the  energy 
sector  in  China  until  2050.  In  that  context  a  new  long-term  scenario  was  sketched  out, 
assuming  continued  strong  economic  growth  and  a  massive  expansion  of  the  urban 
population (from 600 million in 2007 to 1100 million in 2050). The scenario also assumes that 
the  economy’s  energy  intensity  would  reach  (down)  to  the  world  average  by  2020  and 
converge with that of Japan by 2050. With oil production assumed to remain at around 180 
Mtoe, oil imports would reach around 800 Mtoe in 2050. The scenario may be seen as a 
useful thought experiment, and perhaps also as a means to awaken elite opinion in China 
about future challenges. China’s prospective development path will likely require very high 
total levels of energy consumption, even if substantial energy efficiency improvements occur. 
                                                 
5 The high end of that range is slightly different from the ratio of 80% mentioned in the introduction. This is due 
to  the  difficulty  of  converting  between  energy  units  (Mtoe)  and  units  of  volume  (barrels).  Oil  is  not  a 
homogeneous product. One barrel of Chinese oil currently has an average higher heating value (HHV, or GCV) 
of 5.879 MBtu per barrel according to EIA (US DoE) data. Further conversion calculations are necessary to 
arrive at a lower heating value (LHV, or NCV) value. In this paper a ratio of 0.937 was used, based on the 
average HHV / LHV ratio for crude oil in general (US DoE data). Assuming 365.25 days per year, this yields a 
factor of 50.72 for converting data in mb/d into annual Mtoe equivalents for oil produced in China.   
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While  the  latter  may  be  feasible  overall,  a  business-as-usual  approach  with  respect  to 
transportation would, in principle, take China’s oil demand needs to extreme levels. However 
it seems just as reasonable to assume that global oil supply constraints (which would affect 
prices, and thus demand) combined with technological and economic shifts in transportation 
could lead to completely different outcomes.  
 
1.2 Institutional framework and actors in energy policy 
Although the pivotal role of energy for the economic and social development of China was 
stressed  from  the  very  beginning  of  the  reforms  in  China,  no  adequate  institutional 
framework  to  monitor  the  sector  has  been  developed.  While  external  observers  tend  to 
assume  a  powerful  ‘China  Inc.’,  and  well-coordinated  actions  of  politics  and  business 
interests  behind  the  acquisitions  of  oil  resources  abroad,  energy  experts  and  Chinese 
scholars  rather  complain  about  a  lack  of  coherence,  coordination  and  implementation  of 
energy policy in China, including foreign oil policy. 
 
There is no Ministry of Energy in China. Several government agencies that are roughly equal 
in political power (and not subordinate to each other) are involved in the management of the 
energy sector. The only government agency whose authority extends over the entire energy 
sector is the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s top economic 
planning  body.  Its  functions  include  long-term  development  planning,  examining  and 
approving  foreign  cooperation  projects,  approving  investment  plans  and  setting  energy 
prices. But other government institutions have administrative power relevant for the energy 
sector  as  well  (e.g.  the  Ministry  of  Land  resources,  the  State  Environmental  Protection 
Administration, the Ministry of Construction, the State Administration of Taxation). Lately the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also sought to play a larger role, particularly with respect to 
foreign co-operations or acquisitions. 
 
To strengthen the energy administration, in 2005 a ‘Leading Group on Energy’ (LGE) was 
established by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, composed of 13 members of the NDRC and other 
key  ministries.  The  Leading  Group  is  to  act  as  the  steering  committee  for  the  country’s 
energy sector and make recommendations to the State Council. A State Energy Office (SEO) 
provides the administrative support to the LGE, see Meidan (2007: 38). In a further step, in 
2008, the National People’s Congress, China’s legislative body, approved the establishment 
of  two  new  institutions  with  a  focus  on  energy  policy:  The  National  Energy  Commission 
(NEC)  and the  National  Energy  Administration (NEA).  NEA replaces the  NDRC’s  Energy  
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Bureau and also absorbs the State Energy Office under the LGE
6. NEA has a broad mandate 
which  includes  managing  the  energy  industries,  drafting  energy  plans  and  policies 
negotiating with international energy agencies and approving foreign energy investments. It 
reports  directly  to  the  State  Council  on  substantive  matters,  though  NDRC  retains 
responsibility for NEA’s logistics.  
 
Reportedly, NEC is conceived as a full cabinet level regulatory body for energy, consolidating 
the fuel related responsibilities of different existing ministerial and sub-ministerial bodies to 
oversee  the  nation’s  energy  sector  today  and  will  replacing  the  LGE
7.  However,  specific 
functions, organisation and staffing are not revealed to the public yet. The plan to unite the 
various  functions  into  one  Ministry  has  been  raised  several  times  already  since  the 
dismantling of the Ministry for Energy in 1992, but with no success so far. However with the 
NEC reporting directly to the Prime Minister, energy policy has clearly acquired top priority. 
 
China’s large state-owned energy corporations, and especially her national oil companies 
(NOCs),  have  considerable  influence  on  energy  policy.  According  to  Downs  (2007),  the 
power of the NOCs is rooted in China’s transformation from a centrally-planned to a socialist 
market economy, which entailed transforming ministerial structures into corporations. As part 
of this process (see Box 1.1), CNPC and Sinopec retained a ministry-level status, with their 
chief executives holding vice-ministerial ranks. CNOOC has the (political) status of a general 
bureau. As a result, China’s NOCs enjoy easy access to the top-tier of government and can 
deploy  significant  influence  on  energy  policy  formulation.  Consequently,  many  China 
analysts characterise China’s energy sector as one of strong firms and weak institutions, see 
Downs (2007: 70). Another way of looking at this would be to wonder to what extent China’s 
NOCs  are  policy-makers  as  opposed  to  policy-takers,  as  they  have  retained  the  political 
benefits  of ministerial  power  and  influence  while  moving  towards  a  commercial  model  of 
economic behaviour. So while economic efficiency may have been boosted, the question of 
the domestic political balance of power between key actors remains complex. As Downs 
(2007) points out, some inter-weaving of individual careers between government and the 
NOCs occurs. Downs (2007: 71) gives three prominent examples (Zeng Qinghong, Zhou 
Yongkang and Wu Yi) of individuals who had careers in the oil (or oil-related) industry before 
                                                 
6  It  further  incorporates  the  nuclear  power  administration  of  the  Commission  of  Science,  Technology  and 
Industry for national Defence (COSTIND) (Downs, E.S. (2009). China’s ‘New’ Energy Administration. The 
China Business Review, November-December. Retrieved 21 November 2009 from: 
 http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/2008/11_china_energy_downs/11_china_energy_downs.pdf 
7 NPC: National Energy Commission  formed as  ministerial level regulatory body (2008, March 11). China 
Briefing. Retrieved on 25 November 2009 from: 
http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2008/03/11/npc-national-energy-commission-formed-as-ministerial-level-
regulatory-body.html    
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reaching high political office, as well as two prominent examples (Wu Yaowen and Jiang 
Jiemian)  of  former  government  officials  who  reached  very  senior  executive  positions  at 
CNPC. In terms of China’s foreign oil policy, Downs (2007: 76) identifies examples of the 
NOCs  pursuing  ‘corporate  objectives  that  do  not  always  coincide  with  national  policy 
priorities’. In particular, she highlights the case of competitive bidding between CNPC and 
Sinopec for pipeline projects in Sudan, and indicates that elements within China’s political 
leadership were displeased. The latter would prefer if Chinese NOCs worked ‘as a team’, at 
least abroad, for example by focusing on mutually-exclusive geographical regions so as to 




Milestones of China’s energy administration after 1978 
 
1980: State Energy Commission in charge of the oil department, coal department and the electricity department. 
 
1982: The State Energy Commission is removed and the Ministry of Petroleum industry, the Ministry for Coal 
and the Ministry for Electricity are set up. Within the new Petroleum Ministry, the China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (CNOOC) is created for foreign cooperation with regard to China’s offshore oil. 
 
1983: The China National Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) is established by merging assets from 
the Ministry of Petroleum Industry and the Ministry of Chemical Industry 
 
1988: The Ministries for the Petroleum Industry, for the Coal Industry and for Electricity are restructured and 
become state corporations instead (China National Petroleum Corporation, China Coal Corporation and China 
Power Corporation). But these corporations retained ministerial level. Sinopec was granted ministerial level as 
well, while CNOOC has the (lower) status of a general bureau.  
 
1993: The State Planning Commission (SPC) and the Ministry of Mineral Geology take over the administrative 
functions of the Energy Ministry with respect to oil.  
 
1998: Restructuring of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Sinopec and CNOOC into commercial 
enterprises.  Further  on,  CNPC  and  Sinopec  both  become  ‘integrated’  oil  companies,  including  upstream, 
midstream and downstream activities. The SPC absorbs the remaining administrative functions and regulatory 
power with regard to the oil industry, such as drafting long term development plans, examining and approving 
foreign cooperation projects, approving investment plans and price policy.  
 
2000: PetroChina Co., Ltd., a subsidiary of CNPC and Sinopec Co., Ltd. are listed at the New York stock 
exchange and in Hong Kong. 
 
2003: The SPC is renamed State Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Within the NDRC a ‘Bureau 
of Energy’ is established with the task to coordinate and regulate the energy industry  
 
2005: Leading Group on Energy (LGE) and the State Energy Office (SEO) providing administrative support are 
set up by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao.  
 
2008: The National Energy Commission (NEC) and the National Energy Administration (NEA) are approved by 
the NPC. NEA replaces the NDRC’s Energy Bureau and also absorbs the State Energy Office. NEA has a broad 
mandate which includes managing the energy industries, drafting energy plans and policies negotiating with 
international energy agencies and approving foreign energy investments. NEC is at ministerial level and will 
replace the LGE. Details are not revealed yet. 
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1.3. Plans, energy strategies and other policy fields relevant for foreign oil 
policy in China 
 
‘Energy is the priority issue in the economy’ (Deng Xiaoping, 1980)  
 
 
In the course of transition from a centrally planned to a market economy, the responsibility 
for energy security shifted from the government to the big national energy companies which 
developed step by step from ministerial bodies to commercial enterprises. The companies in 
charge  of  oil  supply  are  the  China  National  Petroleum  Corporation  (CNPC),  the  China 
Petroleum  and  Chemical  Corporation  (Sinopec)  and  the  China  National  Offshore  Oil 
Corporation (CNOOC). Until the year 1992, oil supply from domestic sources was sufficient 
to  meet  China’s  rising  demand  and  a  certain  amount  of  crude  was  even  exported  (see 
Section1, Figure 6). When in 1993 demand exceeded supply for the first time, the Chinese 
leadership startled and then-Premier Li Peng designated as the primary goal of the country’s 
energy strategy ‘to secure the long- term and stable supply of oil to China’.
8 Due to restricted 
domestic  supply  and  rising  demand,  China  stayed  a  net  importer  since  then.  But  in  the 
beginning,  the  quantities  of  oil  imported  were  comparatively  small  and  in  the  1990s  the 
international oil market was a buyer’s market, with ample supply and relatively low and stable 
prices (between 20 and 25 $/bbl), posing little threat for China’s energy security. Further on, 
during the Asian financial and economic crisis 1997/1998, China’s oil demand and imports 
were slowing down.  
 
The picture changed dramatically in 2001. After the September 11 terrorist attack on the 
World Trade Center and the beginning of the second Iraq war, the Middle East, the most 
important source for Chinese oil imports, was perceived as less secure. At the same time, 
domestic demand for energy, including oil, accelerated dramatically (see Section 1.1, Figure 
1.2); power shortages all over China raised the awareness for energy security as a basis for 
economic development and called for government action. Also, with increasing amounts of 
oil imported, China became an important factor on the international oil markets. In 2003, 
China surpassed Japan as the world’s second largest petroleum consumer after the USA. In 
the  light  of  this  development,  the  Development  Research  Center  of  the  State  Council 
assembled leading energy research institutes in China to analyse the energy situation and to 
recommend a comprehensive energy strategy. The team produced a summary report and 11 
                                                 
8 Quoted from Calabrese (2008), p. 244  
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sub-reports which were published in 2004 as the ‘China National Energy Strategy and Policy’ 
(NESP), the first comprehensive long term energy strategy of China. Also, in March 2003, a 
new leadership generation, the so called ‘fourth generation’ under president Hu Jintao and 
Premier Wen Jiabao, came into power, who emphasised qualitative instead of quantitative 
growth and paved the way for a demand oriented energy policy.  
 
The ‘China National Energy Strategy and Policy’ (NESP) 
After analysing the current situation and prospects for energy supply and demand in China,  
the experts collaborating in NESP recommended the flowing strategies:  
 
·  Make the best use of domestic resources, while looking actively for foreign resources. 
·  Keep a better balance between supply and demand oriented energy policies, with the 
latter given priority (by energy saving and increasing efficiency). 
·  Make environmental protection an integral part of energy development strategy. 
 
‘Making good use of international resources’ basically refers to foreign oil policy. Under the 
assumption that China’s domestic oil output will stay more or less stable, and consumption 
will increase, imports will increase substantially and oil dependency may reach 60%-70% in 
2020 (see Section 1.1, Table 1.1) and up to 80% by 2030 (see IEA, 2009). Thus oil security 
will increasingly be an important policy consideration for China.  
 
According to NESP, oil security entails guaranteeing that the country’s demand for oil (which 
is  necessary  for  the  sustainable  development  of  both  economy  and  society)  is  met  in 
satisfactory terms as regards quality, quantity and price. Oil insecurity, on the other hand, 
refers to potential damages on the country’s economy due to temporary and abrupt supply 
cut-offs, broader shortages, or price shocks. NESP also acknowledges that the rapid growth 
of  China’s  energy  demand  will  exert  increasingly  greater  influence  on  the  international 
energy  market  and  that  as  a  result  “China’s  energy  issues  have  become  hot  issues  in 
international political and diplomatic realms”, See DRC (2004), p. 4 and p. 15.  
 
To get a correct outlook on ‘petroleum security’, China must first understand the functioning 
of the international oil market and corresponding geopolitics. In the view of NESP: 
·  Neither OPEC nor OECD can unilaterally decide petroleum prices and control the 
international market in the long run 
·  Non-OPEC petroleum exporters play a more and more important role in oil (and gas) 
export, especially Russia, Norway, Mexico and some west African countries.  
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·  More countries with rapidly expanding oil imports are appearing, especially in Asia 
(e.g. India, Indonesia). 
·  Both petroleum consuming and exporting states are diversifying their export (import) 
channels to stabilize supply and demand and obtain better economic benefits  
·  A  new  batch  of  grand  multinationals  has  mushroomed  in  the  world’s  major 
exporting/importing countries via mergers and acquisitions and the development of 
upstream and downstream supply channels. These multinational giants have allied 
with international financial consortiums to emerge as major players, influencing the 
international market.  
 
As a consequence, the international oil supply may have temporary shortages and short-term 
local shortages. World oil prices may suffer short-term violent fluctuations (If the oil price is 
too high it may reduce China’s GDP growth rate, if it is too low, it may result in losses for the 
domestic oil sector). Natural and other disasters may have grave impacts on production and 
transportation  of  oil.  China’s  petroleum  companies  seem  not  strong  enough  and  lack 
experience in international comparison. 
 
In the light of these challenges, the following measures and strategies to provide oil security 
are proposed
9: 
·  China should use the international oil market as a major way of getting oil and oil 
products, including future markets.  
·  China should diversify the sources of her oil imports, with a focus on Russia and the 
Middle East. (The Middle East will be still the most important oil import source until 
2030). In the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq offer great potential 
for China’s oil business, including exploration, development, refineries and pipelines, 
taking advantage of China’s advanced technology in these fields. The areas around 
the Caspian Sea and Central Asia are very interesting in this respect as well.  
·  Chinese  oil  companies  should  invest  more  upstream.  In  the  last  century,  these 
companies have not invested enough upstream, especially in oil exploration, in China 
and abroad. Also, research and development in this area should be enforced. 
·  The reform of the Chinese national oil companies must be deepened and strong and 
powerful international oil companies should be constructed, including both upstream 
and downstream activities. They should engage in joint ventures and seek to obtain 
                                                 
9 Development Research Center of the State Council (eds.) (2004), English Summary Report, China’s Oil and 
Gas Resources and Safety Countermeasures.  
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shares in petroleum exploration blocks, natural gas fields, oil and gas pipelines and 
other energy assets. 
·  A  proper  mix  of  competition  and  alliances  should  be  aimed  at,  with  regard  to 
countries as well as companies. 
·  To  better  handle  fluctuations  in  oil  prices  and  quantities  supplied,  China  should 
establish a strategic reserve and precautionary system for petroleum
10.  
 
Probably as a consequence of priority in NESP given to demand oriented policies, in the 11th 
Five Year Plan 2006-2010 of the Chinese government, the target was stipulated to reduce 
the amount of energy used to generate one unit of GDP by 20% compared to the level of 
2005 until 2010. 
  
In 2007, when world oil prices started to rise very fast, reaching 80 USD/bl in December 
2007, increasing quantities and prices together made China’s oil bill climb by more than 70% 
in the first 11 months of the year and energy security was in the focus again. In December 
2007, the State Council Information Office published a White Paper entitled ‘China’s Energy 
Conditions  and  Policies’
11,  building  largely  on  the  NESP,  but  with  a  stronger  focus  on 
environmental issues and the promotion of new and renewable energies. Regarding energy 
security, in addition to the recommendations in the NESP, the White Paper criticises the 
current heavy reliance on spot trading of crude oil and encourages to sign long-term supply 
contracts instead, which has to be seen in the light of the strong increase of oil prices in 2007 
and the intensifying debate on climate change as well. 
 
With regard to safeguard world energy security, the White Paper suggests that ‘dialogue and 
cooperation between energy exporting countries and energy consuming countries as well as 
between  energy  consuming  countries  should be  strengthened’
12.  Probably  with  a  view  to 
China’s perception as a threat to the world’s energy security by other countries, the paper 
states that ‘Energy issues should not be politicised and triggering antagonism as well as the 
use of force should be avoided’. 
 
                                                 
10 Strategic reserves should be equivalent to 40 days’ demand by 2010 and 55 day’s demand before 2020.  
11 China State Council Information Office (2007, December 12). 
12 Notably, China is a member of the energy working group of the Asia –Pacific Cooperation (APEC), the  
ASEAN plus China Japan and the  Republic of Korea (ASEAN +3) Energy  Cooperation,  the International 
Energy  Forum,  the  World  Energy  Conference,  and  Asia  –Pacific  Partnership  for  Clean  Development  and 
Climate. It is an observer of the Energy Charter, a member of the World Energy Council, and collaborates with 
such international organizations as the IEA and OPEC. Regarding bilateral cooperation, China has established  a 
mechanism for dialogue and cooperation in the field of energy with a number of important energy consuming 
and producing countries, such as the US, Japan, Russia, and the European Union, see China State Council 
Information Office (2007, December 12), p. 12.  
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Investments of Chinese oil companies abroad are also supported by China’s so called ‘go 
abroad’  policy.  This  policy,  proclaimed  by  the  Chinese  government  in  2002  supports 
politically  and  financially  foreign  direct  investment  of  Chinese  enterprises  abroad
13.  It  is 
aimed at various targets: to make efficient use of China’s huge foreign exchange reserves, to 
secure resources, to acquire technology, to gain access to established distribution networks, 
and to reduce the risk of Chinese enterprises getting caught by non-tariff barriers to trade. In 
a  longer-term  perspective,  the  goal  is  to  generate  a  group  of  30  to  50  big  transnational 
companies
14 and most probably, the national oil companies will be among them.  
 
Further on, in 2009, China’s National Energy Administration (NEA) put up a three year plan 
for the oil and gas industry. The plan was submitted at the National Work Conference on 
Energy held in Beijing in February 2009. As part of this plan, the government considers to set 
up a fund to support firms in their pursuit of foreign mergers and acquisitions (China Daily, 
12-22 February, 2009). In January 2009, the long-debated draft for a new ‘Energy Law’ was 
submitted to the State Council Legislative Affairs Office for Consideration from which it will go 
to the full State Council and the National People’s Congress (NPC), the legislative body of 




1.4. Means to achieve policy targets: China’s de facto foreign oil policy 
 
1.4.1. The early period (1993-2000) 
 
When  China  became  a  net  oil  importer  in  1993,  her  national  oil  companies  (NOCs)  as 
‘newcomers’ to the international oil market had to buy most oil on the spot market. The major 
sources of oil were the Middle East, the largest oil producing region world wide (42%; Oman 
26%,  Yemen  11%),  (Southeast-)  Asia  (33%;  Indonesia  26%)  and  Africa  (13.6%;  Angola 
7.8%) – see Table 1.3. But when it became clear that China will remain a net importer of oil 
for the years to come, the Chinese began to look for longer term oil deals and contracts that 
went beyond mere supply contracts. 
 
                                                 
13 As the Chinese currency is still convertible at the current account only, a special permit is required for trans-
border capital flows. 
14 Urban (2009) 
15 China’s Energy Law & 12 Energy Five Year (2009, February 6).China Environmental Law. A discussion of 
China’s environmental and energy laws, regulations, and policies. Retrieved on  November 22, 2009 from: 
http://www.chinaenvironmentallaw.com/2009/02/06/chinas-energy-law-12th-energy-five-year-plan/    
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When Iran made significant oil discoveries in 1995, Chinese oil companies immediately tried 
to get involved, in line with the government’s policy ‘to secure long term and steady supply of 
crude oil’ with investment and participation in exploration, development and construction of 
oilfields and infrastructure (see Section 1.2). China tripled oil purchases from Iran to 60,000 
barrels  a  day  and  agreed  to  build  a  joint  oil  refinery  in  China  and  to  cooperate  in  oil 
exploration
16. The agreement came shortly after President Clinton had banned trade with and 
investment in Iran, in response to Iran’s nuclear program and its support towards terrorist 




Main sources of China’s oil imports (1993 and 1998) 
   1993        1998 
rank     mn tonnes  Share (%)     rank     mn tonnes  Share (%) 
    World  15671            World  27323    
1  Oman  4089  26.1     1  Oman  5793  21.2 
2  Indonesia  4018  25.6     2  Yemen  4043  14.8 
3  Yemen  1655  10.6     3  Iran, Islamic Rep.  3620  13.2 
4  Angola  1224  7.8     4  Indonesia  3387  12.4 
5  Papua New Guinea  776  5.0     5  Saudi Arabia  1808  6.6 
6  Libya  708  4.5     6  Angola  1105  4.0 
7  United Arab Emir.  572  3.6     7  Argentina  1057  3.9 
8  Malaysia  513  3.3     8  Vietnam  866  3.2 
9  Australia  403  2.6     9  United States  854  3.1 
10  Singapore  316  2.0     10  Iraq  607  2.2 
11  Vietnam  289  1.8     11  United Arab Emir.  515  1.9 
12  Saudi Arabia  215  1.4     12  Norway  490  1.8 
13  Argentina  201  1.3     13  Malaysia  451  1.7 
14  Pakistan  196  1.3     14  Kazakhstan  409  1.5 
15  United Kingdom  189  1.2     15  Congo, Rep.  382  1.4 
16  Gabon  127  0.8     16  Australia  354  1.3 
17  Guinea  70  0.4     17  Kuwait  282  1.0 
18  Iran, Islamic Rep.  68  0.4     18  Equatorial Guinea  243  0.9 
19  Korea, Dem. Rep.  19  0.4     19  Egypt, Arab Rep.  199  0.7 
20  Russian Federation  14  0.1     20  Canada  163  0.6 
 
Source: UN Comtrade 
 
In 1997, a production sharing contract with Iraq was concluded (Alterman & Garver, 2008, 
p.25), and in 1998, China entered a USD 1.5 billion deal for a large Sino-Saudi oil refinery in 
China and concluded a supply contract for 10 million tons of Saudi oil annually for a 50 year-
period
18. Partly as a consequence, in 1998 Iran ranked 3
rd, Saudi Arabia 5
th and Iraq 10
th 
                                                 
16 Rubin B. (1999 March 1). China’s Middle East Strategy. Meria Middle East Review of International Affairs, 
p.3. Retrieved 1 December 2009 from: http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1999/issue1/jv3n1a4.html  
17  Katzman  K.  (2007,  October  12).  The  Iran  Sanctions  Act  (ISA).  CRS  Report  for  Congress.  Retrieved  1 
December 2009 from: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS20871.pdf 
18 Rubin B. (1999 March 1). China’s Middle East Strategy. Meria Middle East Review of International Affairs, 
p.5. Retrieved 1 December 2009 from: http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1999/issue1/jv3n1a4.html  
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among China’s foreign suppliers of oil. In total the Middle East increased its share in China’s 
oil imports from 42% to more than 60% (see Table 1.3 and Figure 1.10). 
 
In  June  1997,  the  China  National  Petroleum  Corporation  (CNPC)  outbid  US  and  other 
companies to win a major share in two of Kazakhstan's largest oilfields and a contract to 
build a 3000-kilometer pipeline from Kazakhstan to China. Chinese Premier Li Peng lobbied 
actively  for  this  USD  4.4  billion  agreement
19.  Finally,  China  started  co-operation  on  oil 
exploration in Sudan. Because of the beginning of a civil war in 1984 and related atrocities 
and human rights abuses, Western companies gradually the country. China and other Asian 
countries  then  filled  the  gap.  In  1996  CNCP  acquired  a  40%  stake  in  the  Greater  Nile 
Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), a newly created consortium and now the biggest 
oil company in Sudan. (The other shares belong to Malaysia, India and a small share to the 
government  of  Sudan).  In  May  1997,  the  consortium  won  a  twenty-year  project  for  the 
production  and  transportation  of  oil  in  Western  Kordofan.  Chinese  companies  also 
participated significantly in the building of a 1500 km export pipeline and a refinery north of 
Khartoum, both finished in 1999. CNPC provided half of the total investment of USD 540 
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Source: UN Comtrade 
 
                                                 
19 Rubin B. (1999 March 1). China’s Middle East Strategy. Meria Middle East Review of International Affairs, 
p.4. Retrieved 1 December 2009 from: http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1999/issue1/jv3n1a4.html  
20 Shichor, 2008, p.75  
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Sudan thus became China’s second most important source of African oil and by 2003 the 
country had become the 5
th most important source of Chinese oil imports worldwide (see 
Table 1.4). 
 
China’s oil-relations with Angola, on the other hand, were at that time based of trade only, as 
the Angolan civil war was still ongoing and the Chinese government was a supporter of the 
opposition movement (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA) rather 
than of the government.  
 
·  Chinese national oil companies acting in line with government policies / strategies 
while the Chinese government supports their activities 
·  Engagement in upstream, midstream and downstream oil operations abroad
21 
·  Geographical diversification of activities, starting with relatively small fields 
·  Readiness to cooperate with countries respectively regimes who are internationally 
ostracised (‘rogue states’) 
 
As pointed out by various authors in the field, the latter two characteristics of Chinese foreign 
oil policy need not always reflect a deliberate strategy, but could be related to the fact that 
most of the existing oil reserves of the world are already in the hands of (mostly) national oil 
companies (NOCs) of resource-rich countries and (to a much more limited extent) of large 
Western international oil companies (IOCs). As a result, it has been written that ‘China’s oil 
companies arrived late to the petroleum Olympics […] The prizes left in play are expensive 
and often in countries where Western companies refuse to operate because of human right 









                                                 
21 Upstream operations include: searching for oil and drilling exploratory wells and at the same time operate the 
wells that recover to re-direct the crude oil to the surface (‘exploration and production’). Midstream operations 
are  processing  and  storing,  marketing  and  transporting  oil.  Downstream  operations  include:  refining,  the 
petrochemical  industry  and  petroleum  product  distribution  via  affiliated  outlets  and  distribution  companies. 
(However, the trend is to include the midstream operations within the downstream category.)  
22 McKenzie-Brown, P. (2008). China’s Energy Strategy: Panda or Dragon? Oilweek, August, 2008. Retrieved 
26 June 2009, from: http://seekingalpha.com/article/91074-china-s-energy-strategy-panda-or-dragon    
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Table 1.4 
Main sources of China’s oil imports (2003 and 2008) 
 
   2003        2008 
rank     mio t  in %     rank     mio t  in % 
    World  91020            World  178885    
1  Saudi Arabia  15080  16.6     1  Saudi Arabia  36368  20.3 
2  Iran, Islamic Rep.  12394  13.6     2  Angola  29894  16.7 
3  Angola  10103  11.1     3  Iran, Islamic Rep.  21322  11.9 
4  Oman  9268  10.2     4  Oman  14582  8.2 
5  Sudan  6257  6.9     5  Russian Fed.  11638  6.5 
6  Russian Fed.  5254  5.8     6  Sudan  10500  5.9 
7  Vietnam  3506  3.9     7  Venezuela  6463  3.6 
8  Congo, Rep.  3389  3.7     8  Kuwait  5896  3.3 
9  Indonesia  3333  3.7     9  Kazakhstan  5671  3.2 
10  Malaysia  2031  2.2     10  United Arab Emir.  4579  2.6 
11  Australia  1780  2.0     11  Congo, Rep.  4373  2.4 
12  Thailand  1610  1.8     12  Libya  3189  1.8 
13  Equ.Guinea  1460  1.6     13  Brazil  3022  1.7 
14  Brunei  1358  1.5     14  Equ.Guinea  2709  1.5 
15  Kazakhstan  1196  1.3     15  Iraq  1860  1.0 
16  Norway  932  1.0     16  Indonesia  1392  0.8 
17  Kuwait  907  1.0     17  Colombia  1141  0.6 
18  United Arab Emirates  864  0.9     18  Ecuador  1048  0.6 
19  Qatar  676  0.7     19  Algeria  898  0.5 
20  Venezuela  444  0.5     20  Australia  897  0.5 
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1.4.2 Towards a comprehensive oil policy (2000-2008) 
After  the  year  2000,  driven  by  accelerating  domestic  energy  demand,  a  changing 
international environment and a new orientation in economic policy at home (see Section 
1.1), China’s foreign oil policy became ‘broader and deeper’, by: 
·  Developing  support  measures  to  secure  oil  for  China  on  a  long-term  basis  (term 
contracts, equity oil);  
·  Supporting the Chinese NOCs to rival big multinational corporations; 
·  Offering comprehensive packages to oil suppliers such as ‘oil for infrastructure’ and 
‘oil-for- loan’ contracts; 
·  Promoting international cooperation (with Western partners), with a view to acquiring 
advanced engineering technology and services;  
·  Diversifying sources with a focus on Africa, Russia, Central Asia and Latin America; 
·  Diversifying transit and transport routes; 
·  Turning ‘financial reserves’ into ‘resource reserves’. 
 
Different modes of acquiring oil from international markets 
 
Long-term  supply  contacts  provide  a  guarantee  of  delivery  for  the  term  of  the  contract 
(subject to ‘force majeure’), but do not provide a hedge against future price increases as they 
are  usually  adjusted  monthly  to  reflect  changes  in  global  prices.  Global  oil  prices  are 
determined at the spot market. The functioning of the spot market is to swap the mismatch of 
either volume or quality between contracted crude and product demand. 
 
Equity investments, where a company purchases ownership of future oil output, provide a 
hedge  against  international  price  increases  and  allow  within  a  certain  range  to  swing 
production according to current needs. The cost of buying an equity stake in an oil field 
reflects an implicit valuation of expected future output, with the investor assuming the risk of 
price fluctuations; also one might pay a premium for security of supply. (Equity investment 
usually takes the form of ‘production sharing contracts’ whereby the host country retains the 
bulk of the output, typically 65%-80%.) 
 
However, ownership does not always guarantee access. Apart from political and economic 
risks in the host country, there are transport risks as well. Therefore, China strives for a 
regional  diversification  of  her  oil  bases  and  is  also  engaged  in  building  and  diversifying 
transport routes for oil. Her naval modernisation can be seen in this light as well. However,  
- 23 - 
 
under  normal  conditions,  the  market  provides  supply  security  as  well,  since  buyers  can 
always purchase the amount of oil they want at the global price
23.  
 
There  is  also  a  third  mode  of  long-term  upstream  involvement,  the  so-called  ‘buy-back’ 
contractwhich is in a sense between mere trade and an outright equity contract. In such a 
case,  the  foreign  investor  does  not  gain  property  rights,  but  receives  a  pre-arranged 
remuneration rate for its investment, e.g. in the form of an allocated production share, and is 
allowed  to  extract  resources  for  a  set  period,  e.g.  25  years.  The  investor  then  transfers 
operation of the field back to the host country when the contract expires
24. 
 
Because of China’s rapidly growing oil import needs, most of China’s oil imports are supplied 
by long term supply contracts or bought on the spot market rather than derived from equity 
investments. Between 2001-2006, 1 to 2 USD billion were invested abroad per year, but the 
oil imports from licence contracts came up to about 10% of total oil imports only
25. But for 
reasons partly related to the current financial and economic crisis equity investments have 
strongly accelerated recently, see Section 1.4.3. 
 
1.4.2.1 Policy support for long-term contracts 
The White Paper on Energy (2007) stipulated that China should gradually change its current 
position of relying ‘too heavily’ on spot market purchases. Nearly three quarters of the world’s 
oil  reserves  are  in  the  hands  of  state-owned  or  state-dominated  companies,  e.g.  Saudi 
Aramco, National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), Rosneft, Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA). 
This is an increasing tendency (see e.g. Lechner, 2007, p. 11). As a result, the negotiations 
of China’s oil companies are often backed by high-level state–to–state negotiations and take 
advantage of good overall political relations and/or of ‘package deals’ (discussed in more 
detail  below).  One  recent  example  is  a  10-year  contract  concluded  between  Petroleo 
Brasileiro SA (Petrobras) and Sinopec in February 2009. Petrobras would supply Sinopec 
with  150,000  barrels  per  day  for  the  first  year,  rising  to  200,000  barrels  per  day  for  the 
following  nine  years.  (Currently  Brazil  is  supplying  60,000  b/d).  At  the  same  time,  Brazil 
receives a USD 10 billion loan from the China Development Bank. China-Brazil relations 
have substantially  improved after president Liuz Inacio Lula da Silva took office in 2003. 
Another  significant  long-term  supply  contract,  of  around  1  mb/d,  was  concluded  in  2005 
between Sonangol, the Angolan NOC, and Unipec, an affiliate of Sinopec. The agreement 
                                                 
23 For further discussion on this issue please see Chapter 3 of this report. 
24 See e.g. Buy back section, Petroleum Iran web-site. Retrieved 2 December 2009 from: 
http://www.petroleumiran.com/buyback.html 
25  Herbert  Lechner  (2007),  ‚Grenzenloser  Energiehunger,  China  als  Global  Player  im  Wettlauf  um 
Energieressourcen’, in energy1/07, Zeitschrift der österreichischen Energieagentur, 1/07, p. 9  
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came three years after the end of the civil war in Angola. Political relations between China 
and Angola improved rapidly, and in that context China’s Exim Bank pledged an USD 2 




One should also mention that Venezuela’s interest in a long-term supply contract for China, 
possibly reaching 1 mb/d by 2012. President Chavez openly displays affection for China, as 
well as an urge to diversify its export destinations away from the USA. Currently the Chinese 
side is said to be cautious. The quality of Venezuelan heavy crude is one aspect, but doubts 
regarding the credibility and reliability of President Chavez may play a certain role as well. 
  
Another interesting piece of oil diplomacy is China’s long term contract with Russia: In April 
2009, after 15 years of top-level negotiations, China and Russia finalized an agreement to 
build an oil pipeline between the two countries, in combination with a long-term contract to 
deliver 300 million tons over 20 years starting in 2011.  
 
1.4.2.2 Equity oil and package deals 
Acquisition of equity oil seems an attractive way to secure oil supplies and to hedge against 
price increases. It is also felt that this paves the way for Chinese NOCs to catch up with the 
IOCs,  and  is  in  line  with  China’s  ‘go  abroad’  policy.  In  2009,  as  measured  by  market 
capitalisation,  PetroChina  became  the  largest  enterprise  in  the  world.  Also,  its  proven 
reserves  are  estimated  to  exceed  those  of  Exxon,  the  second  biggest  company  (Neue 
Zürcher  Zeitung.  7  July,  2009).  The  Chinese  government  has  chosen  to  support  these 
developments and deploys both financial and political forms of support. 
 
Financial support is provided in the form of access to preferential (below-market rates) loans 
from China’s state-owned policy banks and commercial banks to Chinese companies which 
invest abroad in priority sectors as defined by the Chinese government, most notably natural 
resources,  including  of  course  crude  oil.  This  gives  Chinese  enterprises  a  significant 
competitive advantage over other potential investors, as investment projects in the natural 
resources  sector  typically  require  large  and  long-term  financial  commitments  and  are 
characterised  by  enormous  uncertainty  in  profitability.  China  Export  and  Import  Bank 
(sometimes referred to as China Ex-Im Bank) and China Development Bank (CDB) are the 
two  state-owned  policy  banks  responsible  for  most  of  the  financing.  The  companies  are 
                                                 
26 The loan is payable over 12 years at a strongly concessional interest rate: Libor plus a spread of 1.5% with a 
grace period of up to three years.  
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further supported by Sinosure, China’s official export credit insurance. Sinosure can also 
insure China's overseas investments, and can guarantee both shares and loans. 
  
Political support involves high-level government-to-government negotiations, often leading to 
package deals, especially ‘oil for loans’ and (or in combination with) ‘oil for infrastructure’, 
and  to  some  extent  ‘oil  for  weapons’
27.  In  such  cases,  Chinese  upstream  investment  is 
openly  or  implicitly  linked  to  the  concomitant  provision  of  loans,  and/or  infrastructure 
development  work,  and/or  weapons  sales.  In  the  most  developed  case  the  host  country 
simultaneously  approves  both  the  upstream  investment  in  its  oil  resources  and  obtains 
infrastructure projects which are carried out by Chinese construction firms. The infrastructure 
projects are, moreover, partly paid for using the cash-flow from concessional loans granted 
to the host country by Chinese banks. Obviously such arrangements are particularly suited 
for  developing  countries  which  combine  interesting  natural  resources,  but  have 
underdeveloped infrastructure and weak financial means. The typical case has been referred 
to as the ‘Angola mode’ by Foster et al. (2008) who provide a graphical illustration which we 
reproduce in Figure 1.12.  
 
Figure 1.12 
Chinese package deals in Africa: the ‘Angola Mode’ 
 
 
Source: Foster (2008) 
 
 
                                                 
27 China is expanding its arms exporting activities in general. In many cases there is no connection with oil, but 
Sudan (and potentially Iran) are relevant cases, see e.g. Blank (2009).  
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This type of approach has become an integral part of China’s Africa policy (see Section 1.2). 
It is clear that, with such package deals, a large share of the value added is recycled in 
favour of China in some form, although the preferential financing rates are a boon for the 
host country as well. From the Chinese point of view, these comprehensive deals serve the 
interests of her NOCs (interested in upstream as well as downstream operations); in addition, 
these deals may support, e.g., the Chinese construction industry if infrastructure projects are 
included. Finally, closer political ties may be created which could turn out to be beneficial for 
other purposes as well. Depending on the level of economic development and the policies in 
the host countries, package deals take different forms in different world regions. Concretely, 
the  most  developed  and  broad-based  package  deals  are  found  in  China’s  dealings  with 
African countries. 
 
1.4.2.3 Comprehensive package deals in Africa 
The  clearest  examples  of  (successful)  package  deals  in  Africa  are  Angola  and  Sudan, 
though relevant examples are found in the cases of Chad, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea  and  Niger.  The  main  counter-example  is  Nigeria,  where  none  of  the  contracted 
infrastructure projects were realised and where two of the four oil concessions that were 
initially awarded were later abandoned due to low prospectivity, see Downs (2007: 54). 
 
In  Angola,  after  the  end  of  the  civil  war  in  2002,  reconstruction  became  the  Angolan 
government’s  top  priority  and  although  China  had  supported  the  anti-government  rebels 
during the war, it played a particularly important role in assisting reconstruction. The first 
loans granted by the China Construction Bank and by China’s Export-Import Bank (Exim 
Bank) in 2002 amounted to about USD 150 million and supported the rehabilitation of the 
Luanda Railway and of the electrical network of Luanda. In 2004 China’s Exim Bank pledged 
an  initial  USD  2  billion  oil-backed  loan  to  Angola  to  fund  the  rebuilding  of  shattered 
infrastructure  throughout  the  country
28.  Following  the  opening  of  this  credit  line  in  March 
2004, China acquired its first stake in Angola’s oil industry in July of the same year, namely a 
50%  stake  in  Block  18  through  Sonangol  Sinopec  International  Holding  Ltd.  (SSI)
29. 
Unsurprisingly, critics claim that China’s loans in the months prior provided Sinopec with an 
                                                 
28 The loan is payable over 12 years at deeply concessional interest rate, Libor plus a  spread of 1.5% with a 
grace period of up to three years. In a new credit line opened in 2007, the spread is 1.25% above Libor and 
repayment was extended to 15 years. 
29  SSI is majority owned by Sinopec (55%). The other partners are Dayuan International Development Ltd. 
(31%)  and  CSIH  (13.5%).  China  Sonangol  International  Holdings  Ltd.  (CSIH)  is  a  joint  venture  between 
Angola’s national oil company Sonangol (30%) and a Hong Kong-based private business group (New Bright 
International Development Ltd.,70%) which is allegedly linked to both, the Chinese as well as the Angolan 
government and to both national oil companies in opaque ways (Vines, Wong, Weimer & Campos, 2009 pp. 52-
53; Levkowitz, McLellan Ross, & Warner, 2009, July 10, p. 2).   
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unfair  advantage  over  its  Indian  competitor,  ONGC-Videsh.  The  credit  line  was  later 
extended, much of it in return for increased exports of Angolan crude. However, the loan 
agreement signed between China’s Exim Bank and the Angolan government stipulate that 
the contracts tied to the loan are allocated primarily to Chinese firms and that most of the 
building materials and machinery should be sourced from China
30. In 2007, SSI was awarded 
further equity (25%) in Blocks 3 (05) and 3(05a). Yet signature bonus payments had reached 
very high amounts during the 2004 and 2006 licensing rounds, indicating that China faced 
severe competition in these rounds despite ongoing loans to the Angolan government (Vines 
et al., 2009, p.45). 
 
The close link between oil exploration and infrastructure investment in Sudan before 2000 
has been illustrated in Section 1.4.1 already. In the meantime, China has built 2 pipelines to 
Port  Sudan  and  2  new  oil  terminals  and  has  significantly  extended  the  refinery  north  of 
Khartoum.  Apart  from  the  oil  business,  the  Chinese  are  also  building  power  stations, 
financed by Chinese loans, and are supporting industrial projects and medical facilities. 
On the other hand, CNPC has obtained concessions in 2 Blocks in the Melut basin and one 
in Block 6 in the Fulda field, with a combined capacity of up to 280,000 b/d (calculated from 
Shichor, 2008, p. 75). In July 2007, it was reported that CNPC had signed a 20-year contract 
with the Sudanese government for exploration rights in northern Sudan’s Red Sea waters. 
CNPC will have a majority share of 35-40% (AFP, July 2, 2007; Sudan Tribune, July 2-3, 
2007 – quoted from Shichor, 2008, p. 75). In 2007, CNPC’s Sudanese assets were valued at 
about USD 7 billion
31. Yet only part of the oil retrieved in Sudan is shipped to China. Sudan 
also represents an interesting example for a case where the Chinese government stopped 
supporting outward investment (for political reasons, in 2007), but China’s NOCs continued 
to invest.  
 
Further examples of successful combinations of loans, infrastructure and equity oil business 
in Africa include:  
 
Chad: In 2007, CNPC bought the rights to a vast exploration zone around Koudjiwai and is to 
invest in a joint venture with the Chadian government to build a refinery. There are also plans 
to construct a pipeline  between Chad and Sudan to export oil via Port Sudan. Also, the 
CNPC Service and Engineering Ltd, a wholly-owned subsidiary of CNPC, has signed an 
                                                 
30 Only about 30 percent of contracts have been awarded to Angolan companies (Levkowitz et al., 2009, p. 13). 
In 2009, according to Chinese officials, over 100 Chinese firms were operating in Angola (over 50 of them of 
significant size). Many of these companies use mainly a Chinese workforce; some 40,000, according to Chinese 
officials, work on official infrastructure projects. 
31 Estimate based on data provided by Wood Mackenzie, quoted from Downs (2007), p. 58.   
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agreement with the Chadian government to jointly invest in a refinery north of N’Djamena. 
According to an announcement on the website of CNPC (6 October, 2007), CNPC entered 
service contracts worth USD 3.09 billion in 2006. 
 
The Congo (Republic of the Congo, also known as Congo-Brazzaville): In 2005, China and 
the Congolese government signed two deals that would authorize Sinopec to explore off-
shore blocks. Cheap loans for investments in infrastructure come as part of a package deal. 
In 2007, China bought half of the country's annual oil production
32.  
 
Equatorial  Guinea:  The  country  was,  as  of  2008,  the  third  largest  oil  producer  in  Sub-
Saharan Africa. This is a recent development, and the country only formed an NOC in 2001, 
GEPetrol. In 2006, CNOOC signed a production sharing contract (PSC) for an offshore oil 
field  with  GEPetrol.  CNPC  also  acquired  70%  of  a  block  in  the  Rio  Muni  Basin  (CNPC 
homepage). CNPC and CNOOC signed further contracts to explore an offshore block each in 
late 2007 (African Oil Journal, September 12, 2007).  
 
Republic of Guinea (also known as Guinea, or Guinea-Conakry): In October 2009, amidst 
major unrest and killings of protesters, Guinea’s military rulers announced a huge mining and 
oil deal with the China International Fund Ltd. (CIF). CIF is registered in Hong Kong and is 
part  of  an  opaque  network  of  private  businessmen  with  good  connections  to  both  the 
Chinese and the Angolan governments
33. According to Mines Minister Mahmoud Thiam, the 
Chinese firm would invest more than USD 7 billion in infrastructure projects. In return, the 
company would be a ‘strategic partner’ in all mining projects
34. 
 
Niger: Although mainly attracted by the country’s uranium reserves, China is also active in 
the exploration of oil in Niger
35. In June 2008, CNPC struck a USD 5 billion deal with Niger’s 
government  to  pump  oil  from  the  Agadem  Block  within  three  years,  and  lay  a  2000-km 
pipeline to export it. CNPC also said it would build a refinery (Niger’s first), of a capacity of 
20,000 barrels per day.  
 
                                                 
32 Tom Gjelten (2007, June 26), ‘Congo and China Forge Economic Partnership, National Public Radio (npr), 
online , http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=11428653 , retrieved on 13 July 2009. 
33 Levkowitz et al. (2009, July 10).  
34 See e.g. ‘Guinea and China ‘agree big deal’’, BBC Online News, 13 October 2009. 
35 In April 2009, China granted Niger a USD 95 million preferential loan for the SOMINA uranium mining 
operation, a joint venture between China National Uranium Corporation and the Niger government (China’s oil 
and mineral deals in Africa (2009, November 4). Reuters, quoted from Yahoo! Malaysia News. Retrieved 4 
November 2009 from: http://malaysia.news.yahoo.com/rtrs/20091104/tbs-africa-china-resources-21231dd.html  
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Frustrated by the failure of the politically motivated ‘package deals’ in Nigeria, the Chinese oil 
companies turned to the market. In 2005, Sinopec acquired 28.67% of JDZ
36 Block 2 from 
ERHC, a private Houston-based oil and gas company. Further on, in January 2006, CNOOC 
bought through a private sale
37 a 45% working interest in a lucrative Block, OML 130, in the 
Akpo field for USD 2.3 billion, with significant financial support from China’s Exim Bank
 38. In 
March 2006, CNOOC made a second acquisition, again through a private sale. It paid USD 
60  million  for  a  35%  working  interest  in  OPL229.  The  Block  was  wholly  owned  by  two 
indigenous  companies.  Its  funding  was  guaranteed  by  China’s  Export  Credit  agency, 
Sinosure. In August 2009 Sinopec also acquired Addax Petroleum Corporation, which has 
significant stakes in Nigeria.  
 
Altogether, China’s oil imports from Africa surged from 6.2% of total imports in 1998 to 24.4% 
in 2003 and came up to 30.1% in 2008, second only to the Middle East.   
 
1.4.2.4 Fresh opportunities in Latin America 
Oil relations between Latin America and China are less advanced than for instance with 
Africa and the Middle East. But fresh opportunities have come up for China recently with the 
discovery of more reserves in the region. Furthermore, a general political re-orientation has 
occurred in the region, with many countries becoming less deferent to US interests and more 
receptive  to  strengthening  both  regional  cooperation  and  bilateral  relations  with  far-away 
powers. Those developments are most vividly illustrated by openly leftist leaders such as 
Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and Evo Morales of Bolivia. In a more moderate camp, leaders 
such as Brazil's Luiz Inàcio Lula da Silva, Michelle Bachelet of Chile, Tabaré Vázquez of 
Uruguay and Rafael Correa of Ecuador, are seen as more pragmatic than ideological. The 
case of Argentina under Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (from 2007) and her husband Nestor 
Kirchner  (2003-2007)  seems  somewhat  in  between  the  two  groups  and  is  perhaps  most 
revealing of the economic rationale for these (partial) regional shifts
39.  
                                                 
36 Joint Development Zone between Nigeria and Sao Tome & Principe 
37 From South Atlantic Petroleum Ltd., a company owned by General Theophilus Danjuma, former Defence 
Minister – see ‘Chinese firm targets Akpo Field to boost output’, Oilwatch SouthEast Asia, retrieved 19 October 
2009 from: http://oilwatch-sea.org/content/view/222/1/ 
38 A 10 year low-interest loan of USD 1.6 billion was extended to CNOOC. See Erica Downs (2007), ‘The fact 
and fiction of Sino-African Energy Relations’, China Security, vol. no.3, Summer 
39 Argentina firmly rejected neo-liberal economic policies after its disastrous financial crisis of 2001, while 
moving closer to oil-rich Venezuela. On the other hand Argentina’s ruling Partido Justicialista (of Peronist, i.e. 
big-tent corporatist, inspiration) has remained a member of the Centrist Democrat International, rather than join 
the Socialist International as suggested by Nestor Kirchner himself. So while left-wing ideology has played a 
role in the region, the relative shift of economic power  away from  the United States and towards both oil 
producing states and China offers an explanation for recent developments as well.  
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One major obstacle to increased energy cooperation between China and the region is the 
sheer distances involved, and the lack of straightforward shipping routes. That is why China 
considers considering funding a pipeline through Columbia, which would take Venezuelan 
crude to the Pacific
40. 
 
To take advantage of new opportunities China has adjusted her oil policy to better fit the 
different requirements of Latin American oil producers. Brazil, for instance, is not interested 
in selling equity oil for the moment but needs financial means for the exploration of recently 
discovered oil reserves off-shore. Thus a long-term supply contract combined with an oil-
backed loan turned out the best solution for both parties. However concessions could be 
discussed  in  the  future
41.  Some  of  the  other  Latin  American  countries  welcome  equity 
investment, as well as downstream investment, often in the form of joint ventures with their 
respective  national  oil  companies.  In  general,  ‘oil  for  loan’  packages  seem  to  be  more 
attractive for countries of the region than ‘oil for infrastructure’ packages, thus reflecting the 
higher  development  level  of  the  region  as  compared  to  most  of  Africa.  If  infrastructure 
projects are included in a deal, however, the projects are typically oil-related infrastructure 
items such as pipelines. In 2004, for instance, China’s president Hu Jintao, on his tour of 
Latin America, signed a USD 10 billion energy deal with Brazil for investments in its energy 
and transport infrastructure. Prior to that, Sinopec had agreed to a USD 1.3 billion project 
with Brazil's Petrobras to build a 2,000 kilometer natural gas pipeline.  
Another dimension of the expanding links between China and Latin America concerns the 
negotiation  and  conclusion  of  Free  Trade  Agreements.  The  first  such  agreement  was 
between China and Chile. It covers trade in goods and came into effect in mid-2006. While 
that agreement was perhaps more a reflection of Chile opening up to the world economy
42 
than of China ‘moving in’, it is not to be the last FTA between China and Latin America. 
Indeed, China and Peru signed an FTA in 2009, to come into force on 15 January 2010. 
 
China’s special relationship with Venezuela  
Relations  between  China  and  Venezuela  are  close  and  are  largely  driven  by  President 
Chavez’s  strained  relations  with  the  USA  and  his  fierce  attempts  to  reduce  Venezuela’s 
dependence on the US market which currently takes more than 50% of its crude. Venezuela 
hopes to supply 15 to 20 per cent of China's oil import needs in the future
43. 
                                                 
40 Ethical Corporation, March 8, 2006. 
41 On 20 May 2009, Petrobras and Sinopec signed a memorandum of understanding on oil exploration, refining 
and petrochemicals. China will explore for oil in two areas of Brazil.  
42 Chile has FTAs and PTAs (preferential trade agreements) with countries across the Americas in addition to 
trade agreements with several Asia-Pacific countries, e.g. Japan, India, New Zealand. 
43 China Daily, August 27, 2005. Retrieved 10 July 2009 from:  
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In  December  2004  already,  President  Chavez  offered  China  wide-ranging  access  to  the 
country's oil reserves. The offer, made as part of a trade deal between the two countries, will 
allow China to operate oil fields in Venezuela and invest in new refineries. Chinese firms 
would be allowed to operate 15 mature oil fields in the east of Venezuela. He also offered to 
supply 120,000 barrels of fuel oil a month to China. In August 2005, CNPC signed an initial 
agreement with PDVSA, to develop and manage Venezuela's Zumano oilfields in the eastern 
part of the country. In 2006, CNPC acquired licenses to explore Venezuela's Orinoco oil belt 
and the Caracoles and Intercampo Norte oilfields, and holds options on others. Also, China is 
building a plant to process Orimulsión, a heavy tar fuel. In 2006, oil shipments to China 
reached around 120,000 barrels a day
44.  As a result of these developments, China’s oil 
imports from Venezuela surged from 444 million tonnes in 2003 to 6,463 million tonnes in 
2008 (see Table 1.3). This trend seems set to continue. In 2008, CNPC entered into two 
agreements with PDVSA, under which a joint venture was established to drill for super-heavy 
oil at Junin-4 block in the Orinoco belt. The annual production target of the joint project, in 
which CNPC has a 40-percent stake, is 20 million tons. During a visit to China in September 
2009, President Chavez announced a deal worth USD 16 bn with China to drill for heavy oil 
in the resource-rich Orinoco basin
45.  
 
Another special feature of the China-Venezuela relationship is the  ‘Joint Financing Fund’ 
which  was  set  up  in  2007  and  which  aims  at  investments  in  education,  health  and 
infrastructure programs in Venezuela. Although not tied to a particular oil deal, it certainly 
backs oil business between China and Venezuela in general. As an indication of that, in 
February 2009, during Vice President Xi Jipings South America tour, the Fund was boosted 
from USD 6 billion originally to USD 12 billion (with China contributing USD 8 billion and 
Venezuela the rest) and at the same time 12 cooperation agreements between China and 
Venezuela were signed, e.g. one calling for Venezuela's state oil company, Petroleos de 
Venezuela SA (PDVSA) to sell CNOOC between 80,000-200,000 barrels of oil per day to 
pay off a debt between development banks in  both nations. Another agreement calls for 
building  a  refinery  in  China  to  handle  Venezuelan  crude  from  the  oil-rich  Orinoco  basin 
(China Daily, June 29-July 5, 2009).  
 
                                                                                                                                                         
 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-08/27/content_472663.htm  
44 What does intrigue observers, however, is not so much the volumes, but the price. According to one well-
versed source in the Venezuelan oil industry, China is reportedly paying only USD3 to –USD 4 a barrel, a small 
fraction of the world market price charged to other foreign consumers, see Schiller, B. (2006, March 2). The axis 
of oil: China and Venezuela. Open Democracy. Retrieved 18 September 2009 from: 
www.opendemocracy.net/articles/View.jsp?id=3319 
45 Wan Zhihong (2009, September 18). Venezuela, China ink $ 16b oil deal. China Daily  
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The energy relationship between China and Bolivia displays a certain ideological component 
as well. On 21 July 2009 Bolivia completed nationalisation of its oil and gas sector. This may 
open up fresh opportunities for China for cooperation in this field, as Evo Morales considers 
China a ‘political, ideological and programmatic ally of the Bolivian people’
46 and has invited 
China to help develop the country’s natural gas resources. 
 
China’s  oil  relations  with  the  other  Latin  American  countries  are  more  pragmatic.  Many 
negotiations  are  conducted  on  a  commercial  basis  and  Chinese  oil  companies  find 
themselves  competing  with  other  private  or  national  oil  companies.  But  in  certain  cases 
governments  are  also  involved  and  political  support  is  used  to  finalise  agreements  or  to 
obtain  more  favourable  conditions.  For  instance,  in  July  2009,  PetroChina  started  to 
negotiate with Ecuador for oil purchases of 0.096 mb/d over two years. The deal foresees an 
advance payment of USD 1 billion for future oil purchases. In essence this is an ‘oil for loan’ 
deal.  As  part  of  the  negotiations,  Ecuador  asked  that  China  uses  the  crude  oil  for 
consumption purposes, rather than resell it to Peru or Chile as that would ‘distort the market’ 
(China Daily, 2009, July 15).  
 
Some examples of major private deals of Chinese oil companies  
In  2005,  PetroChina  and  Sinopec  jointly  purchased  oil  and  gas  assets  from  Ecana  in 
Ecuador, and established Andes Petroleum Ecuador Ltd.
47 In 2006, the Indian Oil & Natural 
Gas  Corp  (ONGC)  and  Sinopec  formed  a  50/50  joint  venture  to  acquire  Omimex  de 
Colombia  from  Texas-based  Omimex  Resources  for  USD  850  million.  Omimex’  assets 
constitute  a  100%  interest  in  the  Velasquez  oilfield  and  a  50%  interest  in  the  Nare  and 
Cocorna  oilfield  where  the  Columbian  national  oil  company,  Ecopetrol  SA,  holds  the 
remaining 50%. Omimex also owns a 189 km pipeline to a refinery
48. In 2008, a consortium 
with CNPC, the Korea National Oil Corp (KNOC) and Argentina's Pluspetrol was formed to 
explore an oil field in an oil rich area in Colombia. Under the consortium, KNOC owns a 30 




                                                 
46 The Washington Times, 10 January 2006. 
47 China Daily, 2009, 15 July 
48 ONGC, Sinopec acquire Columbia’s Omimex (2006, September 21), The Financial Express/-Press Trust of 
India. Retrieved 22 October 2009 from 
 http://www.financialexpress.com/old/latest_full_story.php?content_id=141077  
49 Moon A. (2008, July 24). KNOC says wins Colombia oil exploration rights. Reuters. Retrieved on July 2009 
from http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKSEO8580020080724   
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CNPC operates five oilfields in Peru, accounting for about 33 percent of the country’s total oil 
output
50. In 2010, the government of Peru will auction new lots, providing fresh opportunities 
for China. Some challenges exist, however, as a large part of Peru’s oil reserves are located 
in the country’s south-eastern rainforests, allegedly one of the most bio-diverse areas on 
earth and home to remote tribes, especially in the Madre de Dios region at the border with 
Brazil. Already in 2005, when Peru had signed an USD 83 million contract allowing CNPC 
firm to explore for oil in this area, fierce protests from environmentalists were raised.
51  
 
Altogether,  after  falling  behind  between  1998  and  2003,  China’s  oil  imports  from  Latin 
America have increased significantly and reached 7% of total imports in 2008. Finally, one 
should mention China’s interest in developing an overland pipeline from Venezuela through 
Colombia and onto the Pacific coast of South America. That project may be seen as an 
attempt to diversify transit routes from the Chinese point of view. Such infrastructure would 
reduce China’s dependence on transit through the Panama Canal. 
 
1.4.2.5 Russia and Central Asia 
From a geopolitical perspective the second most important world region for oil is Eastern 
Europe and Eurasia, including Russia and the Caspian Basin. The share of this region of 
about  20%  in  world  oil  trade  will  stay  more  or  less  constant,  with  Russia’s  importance 
declining and that of Central Asia rising. Compared to that, the share of Russia and Central 
Asia in China’s oil imports is rather small though rising from 7.2% in 2003 to 9.8% in 2008. 
Beyond that, the region is in China’s direct neighbourhood and is the only one from which oil 
need not be shipped but can be transported overland (typically by pipeline) instead. This 
gives  the  region  a  special  importance  from  the  Chinese  perspective,  as  both  supplier 
diversification and diversification of transit routes are increased simultaneously. For historical 
reasons, however, until recently all existing pipelines for oil as well as for gas ran westwards 
towards Russia and Europe. China’s most important policy issue with regard to oil in this 
region is therefore the building and securing of transport routes from the region to China. A 
second issue is to secure that the pipelines can be filled appropriately to keep pace with the 
rising demand for oil in China, by long term contracts respectively an extension of the oil 
bases  there.  Again,  China  frequently  uses  concessional  loans  from  her  policy  banks  to 
achieve acceptance of her goals from her partners. 
                                                 
50 Zhu,Winnie (2007, August 28). China may expand oil exploration, refining, investments in Peru. Bloomberg. 
Retrieved October 22, 2009 from 
 http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=atJuj9oQFLBU&refer=latin_america  
51 Ford D. (2009, August 5). Interview: Peru sees energy investments up despite protests. Reuters  
http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN05283599 
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In April 2009, after 15 years of negotiations, China reached an agreement with Russia, to 
build an oil pipeline between the two countries, in combination with a long term contract to 
deliver 300 million tons over 20 years (15 million tons p.a.) starting in 2011. As part of the 
deal,  China  will  supply  a  USD  25  billion  loan  (20  years)  to  Russia’s  state-run  energy 
companies  (USD  15bn  to  oil  company  Rosneft
52  and  USD10bn  to  pipeline  monopoly 
Transneft) – at a preferential interest rate of 6%. The new pipeline will be a branch of the 
East Siberia Pacific Ocean (ESPO)
53 pipeline and will run from Skovorodino via Mohe to 
Daqing in the Chinese province of Heiliongjiang. The Russian section Skorovodino-Mohe 
(67km) will be built by Russia, the Chinese section from Mohe to Daqing (965km) by China 
and should be operational by the end of 2010
54. The pipeline will be jointly operated by China 
(PetroChina) and Russian partners. 
 
The  second  successful  deal  so  far  is  with  Kazhakstan.  Relations  between  China  and 
Kazakhstan in the field of oil and gas are deep and were further extended by an agreement 
on a ‘strategic partnership’ signed in 2005 and a further agreement signed in 2006 called the 
‘Co-operation Strategy for the 21
st Century’. Further strengthening of bilateral relations has 
been signalled in the course of 2009.  
 
Already in 1997, CNPC had won a major share in two of Kazakhstan's largest oilfields and a 
contract  to  build  a  pipeline  from  Kazakhstan  to  China  which  would  also  supply  Iranian 
refineries. Chinese Premier Li Peng lobbied hard to secure this USD 4.4 billion deal
55. In 
2004, CNPC and KazMunaiGaz, the Kazakh state energy company, agreed to build a cross-
border pipeline. The first part of that pipeline, of a length of 962 km, runs from Atasu in 
Central Kazakhstan to Alashankou, in China’s western province of Xinjiang. From there a 
further pipeline, of a length of 246 km on Chinese territory, leads to the Dushanzi refinery, 
also in Xinjiang. Construction of the first part of the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline took place 
between September 2004 and December 2005. The first oil shipments reached Dushanzi in 
July 2006. For the moment the capacity of the line into China is 10 million tonnes per year 
                                                 
52 In 2006, CNPC bought a USD 500 million slice in Rosneft’s USD 10.4 billion initial public offering (China 
Daily, 11-12 November 2006 
53 The ESPO will be 4700 km long and will lead from Taishet to Kazmino bay, near Nakhodka, at the Sea of 
Japan. The first section  from Taishet to Skovorodino should be finished by 2009, the second section  from 
Skovorodino to Kazmino (Kosmino) should then start. The ESPO is an attempt o Russia to diversify its supplies 
to the East. By 2020 exports to the Asia-Pacific region should reach about 30% (compared to 3% in 2008). 
54 Obviously, prices for Russian oil follow world market prices, as in January –March 2009, Russia exported 
3.28 millions of crude to China, 5.8% up year-on-year. But first quarter Russian crude supplies to China were 
52.1 percent down in terms of value. 
55 Rubin B (1999 March 1). China’s Middle East Strategy. Meria Middle East Review of International Affairs, 
p.4. Retrieved 1 December 2009 from: http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1999/issue1/jv3n1a4.html   
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(roughly 0.2 mb/d) and relies on supplies from central Kazakhstan. The key missing link was 
to  build  an  extension  through  Central  Kazakhstan  to  connect  China  all  the  way  to 
Kazakhstan’s large Caspian fields. That work was completed in July 2009, so there is now a 
full-length link, totalling 2,228 km, linking China to Caspian oil fields in Kazakhstan. Transit 
capacity upgrades therefore seem likely in the medium-run.  
 
Also in 2005, CNPC acquired PetroKazakhstan, a Canada based oil company operating in 
Kazakhstan,  for  USD  4.18  billion  (the  then  largest  overseas  acquisition  ever  made  by  a 
Chinese company), which is going to fill a substantial part of its oil production (10 million tons 
per  year  in  2008)  into  the  new  pipeline.  PetroKazakhstan  has  a  50:50  joint  venture  with 
KazMunaiGaz in the important Akschabulak oilfield and operates jointly with Lukoil in the 
Kumkol and in the Northern Buzachi fields.  
 
In 2009, the China National Oil & Gaz Exploration and Development Corporation (CNODC, 
an affiliate of PetroChina) and KazMunaiGaz formed the company Mangistau Investments 
B.V.,  a  joint  venture  in  which  each  side  took  a  50%  stake,  to  acquire  100%  of 
MangistauMunaiGas  (MMG),  one  of  Kazakhstan’s  largest  private  oil  and  gas  exploration 
companies. The deal includes oil and gas fields and other upstream exploration assets. By 
31 December 2008, MMG’s proven plus probable exploitable crude oil reserves reportedly 
totalled about 370 million barrels, with annual production at about 40 million barrels (0.11 
mb/d).
56 To help fund the project, PetroChina lent KazMunaiGaz USD 5 billion, and China 
Exim Bank lent a further USD 5 billion. CNPC will then receive half of the oil that will be 
produced by the jointly owned MMG (the other 50 % will be owned by the Kazak state-owned 
firm KazMunaiGaz). As a result, some commentators have labelled this recent deal as a 
‘loan-for-assets’ deal, rather than a ‘loan for oil’ deal
57, though the former remains clearly 
more frequent than the latter in general. 
 
China’s  focus  in  Uzbekistan  and  Turkmenistan is  on natural  gas,  given  the  resources  of 
those countries. However CNPC has signed an agreement with Uzbekistan to jointly develop 
a small oilfield as well. In July 2005, Turkmenistan and China signed an agreement on oil 
and gas cooperation and China extended a USD 24 million low-interest loan to Turkmenistan 
for the development of its oil and gas industry. 
 
                                                 
56  China  Stakes.com.  Retrieved  July  2,  2009  from,  http://www.chinastakes.com/2009/4/petrochina-and-
kazmunaigaz-team-up-to-acquire-kazakhstans-mmg.html 
57 See e.g. Jian W. (2009), ‘China's oil partners hang onto assets’, Alexander’s Oil and Gas Connections, volume 
14, issue #13.  
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1.4.2.6. The Middle East: China’s hot spot for oil 
From the very beginning, the Middle East has been the most important source for Chinese oil 
imports. And taking into account the fact that according to IEA (2007) almost two thirds of the 
worlds proven oil reserves are located there and that between 2007 and 2030 net exports 
from this region will contribute 60% to the increase in total oil trade, it will remain so in the 
future. However, over the last ten years China has significantly diversified her imports and 
the share of the Middle East in total imports came down from over 60% in 1998 to 48% in 
2008 – compare Figures 10 and 11. Within the region, Saudi Arabia became the shooting 
star while the smaller suppliers such as Yemen and Oman lost importance. Since 2003, 
Saudi Arabia is the biggest supplier of oil to China. Iran is the second exporter of Middle East 
oil to China and ranks third (after Angola) in total oil trade (Table 3). The rising importance of 
Saudi Arabia for China is a result of its huge production capacities but also a consequence of 
the endeavour of both sides for a persistent good relationship and of co-operations both 
upstream and downstream. The latter is partly related to the technical difficulties to process 
heavy or ‘sour’ crude oil but could be seen in the light of oil security as well. 
 
Already in 1998 China made a USD 1.5 billion deal for a huge Sino-Saudi oil refinery in 
China and concluded a supply contract for 10 million tons of Saudi oil annually for a 50 year-
period
58. In 1999, an agreement was reached to open up the Chinese refinery sector to Saudi 
investment and to make oil exploration and development opportunities available to Chinese 
investors. However, large scale Sino Saudi cooperation in the energy field kicked off in 2003 
only.
59 As a result, Sinopec and Saudi Aramco began to collaborate on downstream projects 
in China, joining forces to build a refinery in Qingdao and to expand a petrochemical facility 
in  Quanzhou.  Saudi  Basic  Industries  Corporation  (SABIC),  the  Middle  East’s  largest 
petrochemical company, has reportedly been involved in talks regarding several downstream 
projects in China as well
60. In Meanwhile, Chinese companies are seeking to acquire and 
expand their footholds in Saudi Arabia as well. In 2004, Sinopec won the bid for a natural gas 
project in a north-western block of the Rub al-Khali gas fields, an area that Saudi Arabia has 
opened up to foreign firms for the first time in 25 years (worth about USD 300 million)
61. 
                                                 
58 Rubin B (1999 March 1). China’s Middle East Strategy. Meria Middle East Review of International Affairs, 
p.5. Retrieved 1 December 2009 from http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1999/issue1/jv3n1a4.html 
59  See Chen Mo, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Institute of West-Asian and African Studies; in IIAS 
Newsletter 51, summer 2009. Retrieved 18 October 2009 from: 
http://www.iias.nl/article/securing-chinas-oil-supply-saudi-arabia-sudan 
60 In 2006, it was agreed that Saudi Arabia will set up a 10 million cubic-meter oil storage facility on Hainan 
Island Alterman & Garver, 2008, p.25.  
61 Alterman & Garver, 2008, p.25 and Calabrese, J. (2005, 25 September). Saudi Arabia and China Extend Ties 
Beyond  Oil.  China  Brief,  Vol  5,  issue  20,  The  Jamestown  Foundation.  Retrieved  22  October  2009  from:  
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Saudi Arabia’s upstream oil sector, which was developed with American technology, has not 
yet  been  opened  up  for  foreigners
62.  In  2006,  China  and  Saudi  Arabia  signed  five 
agreements including one on closer energy cooperation (China Daily, January 24, 2006).  
 
Oil trade between Iran and China accelerated sharply during the 1990 and kept pace with 
rising Chinese oil demand thereafter. A number of agreements are worth looking at. In 1995, 
the two countries signed a general bilateral trade deal, reportedly worth USD 2 billion trade 
deal. As a result, China tripled oil purchases to 60,000 barrels a day and agreed to build a 
joint oil refinery in China and cooperate in oil exploration. China also built power plants and 
cement  factories  in  Iran.  Still,  arms  sales  have  been  China's  leading  single  field  of 
endeavour
63. In 2001, Sinopec signed a USD 150 million deal to design and build an oil-
unloading terminal at Neka and modernize refineries at Rey and Tabris
64. In 2007, after 3 
years  of  negotiations,  Sinopec  signed  a  contract  with  Iran,  to  jointly  develop  the  new 
Yadawaran  oilfield  estimated  to  contain  3  billion  barrels  (first  phase:  USD  2  billion)  – 
neglecting the US embargo against Iran. In the first 4 years, production is expected to reach 
85,000 b/d, which will be extended later. In exchange, China agreed to purchase – at market 
rates – 10 million tonnes of LNG a year over 25 years. (There was also an agreement with 
CNOOC for upstream and downstream development of the North Pars natural gas field). 
 
Iraq has been a minor supplier of oil to China in the recent past, not least due to the Iraq War 
and its aftermath. However Iraq’s large reserves and correspondingly large export potential 
have  made  the  country  a  primary  target  for  China’s  foreign  oil  policy
65.  In  2008,  an  old 
contract concluded between Saddam Hussein and China in 1997, which included production 
sharing rights, was revived but transformed into a 20 year service contract of a value of USD 
3 billion, under which China would be paid in oil for its work at the al-Ahdab oil field southeast 
of  Baghdad,  with  an  estimated  production  capacity  of  90,000  bbl/d,  but  would  not  be  a 
partner in the profit (International Herald Tribune, August 21, 2008). In this context, China 
agreed to cancel a large portion of Iraqi debt to China
66. This was Iraq’s first contract with a 
large foreign oil company since the fall of Saddam. The contract also requires China to build 
                                                                                                                                                         
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3895&tx_ttnews%5BbackP
id%5D=195&no_cache=1  
62  Chen  Mo,  Chinese  Academy  of  Social  Sciences,  Institute  of  West-Asian  and  African  Studies;  in  IIAS 
Newsletter 51, summer 2009. Retrieved 18 October 2009 from:   
http://www.iias.nl/article/securing-chinas-oil-supply-saudi-arabia-sudan.  
63 Rubin B (1999 March 1). China’s Middle East Strategy. Meria Middle East Review of International Affairs, 
p.4. Retrieved 1 December 2009 from: http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1999/issue1/jv3n1a4.html  
64 Alterman & Garver, 2008, p.25.  
65 ‘Domestic companies can never find bigger opportunities in other places than in Iraq, which has the third 
largest proved oil reserves in the world’, Prof. Lin Boqiang, Xiamen University (China Daily, July 7, 2009). 
66 Alterman & Garver, 2008, p.25.  
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a major electrical station in the area
67. In June 2009 CNPC, together with BP, won the bid to 
increase output at the Rumaila oilfield, Iraq’s largest oilfield. The technical service contract 
was signed in November 2009. BP and CNPC will work towards increasing production from 
around 1 mb/d to up to 2.85 mb/d and plan to invest up to USD 15 billion for that purpose
68.  
 
1.4.2.7 Transit security investments 
One of the weakest points in China’s oil transit security is the fact that all oil shipments from 
the Middle East, the most important source of oil for China, have to cross the narrow Straits 
of Malacca between Singapore and Malaysia. The Straits of Malacca constitute a ‘choke-
point’  for  oil  transit,  making  it  a  potential  target  for  terrorist  attacks,  piracy,  or  naval 
blockades.  In  addition,  accidents  and  natural  disasters  at  a  choke-point  could  also  have 
knock-on  effects  affecting  transit.  In  order  to  reduce  the  potential  damage  from  such 
incidents, the Chinese government agreed in March 2009 with the Myanmar government to 
construct oil and gas pipelines linking the two countries. The two pipelines will run in parallel. 
Both will start in Kyaukryu port on the west coast of Myanmar and enter China at the border 
city of Ruili in China’s Yunnan province. The 1100 km oil pipeline will end in Kunming. It is 
expected to transfer 20 million tonnes of crude from the Middle East and Africa annually. 
CNPC will hold 50.9% and manage the project, and Myanmar Oil & Gas enterprise will own 
the remainder. The oil pipeline  will also reduce the transport route compared with ocean 
shipping by 1200 km. 
 
A broader strategy to avoid the Straits of Malacca (and indeed the seas altogether) is to shift 
more strongly towards Eurasian sources of oil that can be brought into the country using 
overland  pipelines.  In  this  respect  China’s  interest  in  Russian  and  Caspian  oil  fulfils  a 
desirable goal of diversification of transit routes, in addition to contributing to diversification of 
sources of supplies. A third example  worth recalling in this sub-section is China’s stated 
desire to build a pipeline across South America so as to bring Venezuelan oil to the Pacific 
coast of South America, thus avoiding the use of the Panama Canal (or of circumnavigating 





                                                 
67 Reuters, “Iraq Reaches Oil Agreement with China”, 28 August 2008; Amit R. Paley, “Iraq and China Sign $3 
Billion Oil Contract,” The Washington Post, 29 August 2008; Gina Chon, “China Reached $3 Billion Deal to 
Develop Oil Field in Iraq,” The Wall Street Journal, 29 August 2008. 
68 See e.g.: http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7057650  
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1.4.3 Awash in cash: swapping financial resources for natural resources 
In the course of the current global financial and economic crisis, China’s acquisitions of oil 
sources and other natural resources have significantly accelerated. China has ample cash on 
hand to support overseas investment, with USD 2.9 trillion in foreign financial assets (USD 
1.9  trillion  of  which  are  official  forex  reserves)  at  the  end  of  2008
69.  Suffering  from  the 
depreciation  of  the  US  dollar  and  with  low  interest  rates  world  wide,  there  is  a  strong 
motivation for the Chinese government  as well as Chinese enterprises to offload foreign 
exchange holdings in favour of ‘real sector’ investments, notably (but not exclusively) oil-
related foreign investments. To facilitate outward investment, the Chinese government has 
recently  relaxed  its  foreign  exchange  controls  significantly  and  is  supporting  loans  for 
acquisitions abroad. One example is a five-year USD 30 billion loan at a discounted rate from 
the China Development Bank to CNPC to fund its ‘go global’ strategy. This loan doubles the 
amount  that  the  company  had  earmarked  for  capital  expenditure  in  2009
70.  A  prominent 
example  for  recent,  large  acquisitions  in  the  oil  sector  by  Chinese  companies  is  the 
acquisition of Addax for USD 7.2bn in August 2009 by Sinopec
71. Addax is listed in Calgary 
(CA) but has its headquarters in Geneva and is a small but significant oil producer in West 
Africa and in the Kurdish part of Iraq. Other important example is the purchase of a majority 
stake  in  two  Canadian  tar-sand  projects  for  USD  1.7  billion,  also  in  August  2009  (The 
Economist, 3 September 2009).  
 
Beyond that, several large projects are in the pipeline: in August 2009, China expressed its 
interest in a 30% stake of Ghana’s Jubilee oil field. The new (offshore) oil field is thought to 
hold more than 1.8 billion barrels of light sweet crude oil (Ghana Business News, August 27, 
2009).  Then  in  October  2009,  CNOOC  and  the  Ghana  National  Petroleum  Corporation 
(GNPC) announced to jointly bid for a 23.5% stake in the Jubilee oil field. (Investment News: 
Money Morning, October 12, 2009). 
 
According to media reports in Argentina and in the U.S. in August 2009, CNPC and CNOOC 
are offering USD 17 billion for the acquisition of 84% of YPF, the Argentine unit of Spanish-
based energy giant Repsol YPF. YPF is the leading oil exploration and refining company in 
Argentina  with  a  60%  market  share.  Chinese  media,  citing  an  authoritative  source  even 
                                                 
69 According to the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), quoted in Fei Ya, (2009, May 20), 
‘Overseas assets in 2008 soar to $ 2,92t’. China Daily. 
70 According to Gordon Kwan, head of regional energy research at Mirae Asset Securities in Hong Kong ( Lau J. 
and Dyer, G. (2009, September 9), ‘CNPC boosts war chest with $30 bn loan’. Financial Times 
71  Sinopec  Declares  Successful  Acquisition  of  Addax  (2009,  August  19).  China  International  Investment 
Promotion  Platform  (CIIP).  Retrieved  on  22  October,  2009  from  http://www.ciipp.com/en/index/view-
12995.html  
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suggest  a  bid  for  100%  of  YPF,  whereby  CNPC  expects  to  hold  75%  of  the  asset  and 
CNOOC plans to get the remaining 25%. The price offered by the two Chinese national oil 
giants  totals  USD  22.6  bn.  If  the  deal  succeeds,  it  would  be  the  largest-ever  overseas 
acquisition  for  a  Chinese  company.  However,  none  of  the  companies  has  confirmed  the 
rumours so far.  
 
In September 2009, The Financial Times reported that CNOOC has started negotiations with 
the Nigerian government to acquire a 49% stake in 23 prime blocs, which would provide 
China with additional reserves of 6 bn barrels of oil, equivalent to one in every six barrels of 
proven reserves of Nigeria and significantly more than the estimated 4.7 billion barrels of 
crude China has so far secured in its other African pacts. The offer’s value is not disclosed, 
although some details suggest a figure of about USD 30 bn. Some oil sector executives said, 
the total was USD 50bn. 
 
Finally,  in  October  2009,  certain  reports  indicated  that  CNOOC  was  in  talks  with  the 
Ugandan  government  about  investing  with  London-listed  Tullow  Oil  to  develop  the  Lake 
Albert fields in western Uganda.  
 
The projects mentioned in this sub-section have mostly yet to be confirmed. Some of them 
could fail due to competition from other oil companies or due to protectionist reactions in 
target  countries.  That  said,  the  general  pattern  of  acceleration  is  clear  and  reflects  the 
relative financial advantage that China has over most other nations in the midst of the 2008-














- 41 - 
 




In the following sections we describe our basic macroeconomic projection modelling, and the 
application  of  the  model  to  estimate  the  impact  of  China’s  economic  growth  on  global 
macroeconomic  developments.  This  is  done  with  a  quantitative  model  called  a  CGE 
(computable general equilibrium) model, in which trade and production data are mapped to 
CGE  model  sectors.  We  proceed  with  a  brief  outline  of  the  model,  and  our  projection 
scenario. This is followed by a more detailed analysis of the impact of China’s growth.  A 
more detailed overview of the core projections through 2020, and the underlying model, is 
provided in the companion FIW report (Christie et al 2009). 
 
2.1.1.  Overview of the projection model 
We employ  a  general  equilibrium  model that  enables  us  to  estimate the  impact  of  basic 
macroeconomic trends on global production and trade patterns.  The model is based on the 
Francois, Van Meijl, and Van Tongeren model (FMT 2005) and is implemented in GEMPACK 
– a software package designed for solving large applied general equilibrium models. The 
model  builds  on  Francois  (2000),  and  its  versions  have  recently  been  employed  for  EC-
mandated studies of World Trade Organization negotiations, prospective EU-Korea and EU-
MERCOSUR  free  trade  agreements,  as  well  as  a  recent  large-scale  Asian  Development 
Bank assessment of regional integration schemes in Asia (Francois and Wignaraja 2008, 
2009). The model is solved as an explicit non-linear system of equations, through techniques 
described by Harrison and Pearson (1994). Investment mechanisms are included along the 
lines of Francois, McDonald, and Nordstrom (1996). Social accounting data are based on the 
most  recent  Version  7  GTAP  dataset  (www.gtap.org).  The  GTAP  data  on  protection 
incorporates a set of ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) of border protection across the world.  
 
The sector and regional aggregation schemes for the model are summarized in Table 2.1 
below. Our trade and production data are all valued in 2008 euros. Trade data are based on 
UNCTAD  COMTRADE  data  as  reported  (in  the  case  of  the  EC)  by  Eurostat  and  as 
integrated into the GTAP database.  The basic database is built from the GTAP7 database 
(benchmarked to 2004).  We use the basic input-output structure of the database, combined 
with more recent trade and national accounts data, to re-base our dataset to 2008.  This is 
the starting point for out analysis.  In addition to the 32 sectors listed in Table 2.1, the model 
also includes 16 regions.  These are detailed in Table 2.2.  Critically, the regions include  
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Austria’s major trading partner (Germany), the remaining EU13 (old EU) and EU12 (new EU) 
Members, as well as other major OECD and non-OECD countries and regions. Table 2.2 
also presents underlying macroeconomic trends for these regions from 2008 through 2020.  
The 2020 projections are based on the most recent (October) macroeconomic projections 
from  the  IMF,  as  reported  in  its  World  Economic  Outlook.    We  have  extended  the  IMF 
medium-term projections through 2020. 
 
Table 2.1 
















other transport equipment 
light manufactures 
chemicals rubber plastics 
petrochemicals 
electrical machinery 








other business services 








real growth rate,  
2008-2020 
Austria  283  1.46 
Germany  2,509  1.04 
EU 13  8,446  1.55 
EU 12  1,321  3.12 
EEA  662  1.29 
NAFTA  11,631  2.10 
Other OECD  4,768  2.07 
China  3,103  9.33 
Brazil  1,074  3.26 
Latin America  1,801  3.49 
India  824  7.51 
Russia  1,145  2.92 
ASEAN  863  5.10 
Middle East and North Africa  1,485  4.45 
Sub-Saharan Africa  678  4.98 
Rest of World  1,014  10.26 
source: IMF WEO, October 2009 (with projection through 2020).  
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2.1.2.  IMF-based macro projections 
The model, with its sector and regional aggregation scheme as outlined in Tables 2.1 and 
2.2, is used to project the global economy through 2020. The core of the baseline projections 
is the real GDP growth rates reported in Table 2.2. This is combined with estimated growth in 
population  and  labour  force  by  region  (from  the  IMF,  and  also  from  EUROSTAT).  
Macroeconomic  projection  then  involves  imposing  the  baseline  GDP  and  demographic 
trends on the CGE model, linking investment to underlying income and savings rates, and 
then  using the model  to  estimate  the  underlying TFP growth  rates,  at  the  national  level, 
consistent with the IMF-based growth projections.  We also impose medium-term real price 
trends for energy, based on IEA projections. Because the model also includes employment, 
production, and consumption at the national level by industry, as well as bilateral trade flows, 
we are then able to also estimate changes in the underlying structure of the global economy 
as well.  The estimated changes in global production, employment, and trade are consistent 
with baseline 2008 economic structures (input-output shares), which are taken as a starting 
point. 
 
Table 2.3 below reports the baseline energy price trends, valued at 2008 prices.  We work 
with late 2008 and early 2009 energy prices, as these better reflect long-term trends than do 
the short-term spike in energy prices in early 2008. 
 
Table 2.3  
Energy price trends in the 2008-2020 baseline 
Benchmark prices         
      2004  2008/9  2020 
Crude oil, average  €/bbl  30.4  41.0  85.0 
Natural gas, average  €/mmbtu  4.1  4.5  6.0 
  Source: World Bank Pink Sheets; IEA; industry projections. 
 
 
2.1.3.  China’s impact 
To  estimate  China’s  global  impact,  we  take  as  a  starting  point  the  full  set  of  macro 
projections  summarized  above  in  Tables  2.2  and  2.3.  In  the  baseline,  underlying  growth 
trends through 2020 mean an increased shift in the centre of global economic activity, with 
Asia in particular accounting for a rising share of global production and trade.  This proves 
important in the estimated impact of China on global energy prices. As highlighted in Christie 
et al (2009), the high income (OECD) economies account for 70% of global economic activity 
in 2008, while this share drops to 58% by 2020. This is driven especially by rapid growth in 
China, which rises from 7.5% of global GDP in 2008 to 14.5% in 2020.  NAFTA drops from  
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29.9% to 23.9%, while the EU drops from 30.2% to 24.4%.  Austria’s economy is estimated 
to be 19% higher by 2020 than its level in 2008. 
 
For China, the counterfactual means we “unwind” or remove the direct labour force, output, 
and  productivity  and  investment  changes  in  China  in  the  2008-2020  baseline  projection, 
leaving the size and average productivity  level  of China’s economy at 2008 levels, while 
retaining the full projected mix of labour force and productivity growth for other regions from 
the baseline projection.  We do allow global investment levels to adjust in response to the 
smaller size of China’s economy and the impact this has on savings and investment levels.  
The result is an estimated set of changes linked directly to China’s economic growth, and the 
impact this has on the global economy and on energy prices. 
 
We summarize the basic impact on global growth rates in Table 2.4 below. It is clear that 
China’s rapid growth has a major impact on the growth rates of the rest of the world.  Indeed 
China’s growth is apparently an important driver of growth for a number of countries.  In the 
EU,  China’s  rapid  growth,  and  the  export  opportunities  this  implies,  contributes  0.5%  to 
annual growth rates.  In the NAFTA block and the other (Pacific-Asia) OECD countries, this 
contribution is 0.3% per year.  India, at the other extreme, benefits from a smaller China, as 
India competes more directly in product space with China, both in terms of exports, and in 
terms of demand for raw materials. Indeed, India’s annual growth is estimated to be 1.12% 
higher, approaching China’s current growth rates, in the absence of this competition.  The 
rest  of  the  World  region  (primarily  lower-middle  income  developing  countries)  also  are 
impacted negatively by China’s rapid economic growth, as they, like India, are competing 
with China in export markets, and also for raw materials, including energy. The impact of 
China on global energy prices is summarized in Table 2.5.  In the Table, we provide both the 
projected baseline increase in real energy prices (valued in 2008 euros) through 2020, and 
the marginal contribution that China makes to overall changes in these prices.  Two results 
stand out.  The first is that China is the dominant driver in energy price increases in the 2020 
baseline.  From the table, approximately 90% of projected oil price increases are linked to 
growth in China.  The second is that China’s appetite for oil dampens, slightly, prices for gas.  
The reason is that China’s industrial expansion, fuelled by oil and coal, displaces industrial 
production in the OECD, which is fuelled relatively more by gas.   
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Table 2.4  













Austria  283  1.46  0.95  0.51 
Germany  2,509  1.04  0.54  0.50 
EU 13  8,446  1.55  1.04  0.51 
EU 12  1,321  3.12  2.93  0.19 
EEA  662  1.29  0.61  0.68 
NAFTA  11,631  2.10  1.81  0.29 
Other OECD  4,768  2.07  1.77  0.30 
China  3,103  9.33  0.00  9.33 
Brazil  1,074  3.26  2.64  0.62 
Latin America  1,801  3.49  2.88  0.61 
India  824  7.51  8.63  -1.12 
Russia  1,145  2.92  2.30  0.61 
ASEAN  863  5.10  5.08  0.02 
Middle East and North Africa  1,485  4.45  3.81  0.63 
Sub-Saharan Africa  678  4.98  4.18  0.80 
Rest of World  1,014  10.26  10.59  -0.32 
  Source: Alternative baseline assumptions for projection model.  See text. 
 
   
 
Table 2.5  












of  total price 
increase, % 
Crude oil, average €/bbl  41.0  85.0  45.6  89.6% 
Natural gas, average €/mmbtu  4.5  6.0  6.2  -12.7% 
 
  Source: Alternative baseline assumptions for projection model.  See text. 
 
   
 
This shift in industrial production also means a shift in industrial energy demand from gas to 
oil  and  coal.    In  the  absence  of  this  industrial  expansion  in  China,  the  corresponding 
production  is  shifted  back to  OECD  countries,  with  a  corresponding  drop  in  oil  and  coal 
demand and a rise in gas demand.  Consumer product sectors that are otherwise served by 
a growing China, like textiles, clothing, and electronics, shift production back to the OECD 
(including  Austria)  to  meet  growing  consumer  demand.    At  the  same  time,  sectors  that 
realize drops in demand as China’s industrial production, including metals and chemicals,  
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contract under the alternative baseline.  The same holds for processed foods, where 3.9% of 
Austria’s 2020 production is supported by growing consumer demand in China.  
 
From the results in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 China is an important factor in global energy markets.  
This holds especially for oil and coal, and less so for natural gas.  Indeed, in the baseline 
projections, 2008-2020 growth in China causes a 61.8% real increase in coal prices, and an 
86.6% real increase in oil prices. The shift in industrial production to China actually puts 
downward pressure on gas prices, driving them down 2.5% over the projected baseline.  The 
China effect is not limited to energy, as primary industrial inputs (steel, non-ferrous metals, 
industrial  chemicals,  and  petro  chemicals)  all  experience  strong  increases.  The  overall 
impact on global traded goods prices in shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 
China’s impact on global goods prices 
  Source: Alternative baseline assumptions for projection model.  See text. 
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In this chapter we explore and present explanations for China’s attempt to meet part of its oil 
needs through upstream investments and through a greater recourse to long-term supply 
contracts. What are the possible consequences of those choices, and what motivates them 
from  an  economic  perspective?  To  be  more  precise,  what  do  resource  (and  agricultural) 
property titles (i.e. upstream oil investments) provide when trade and functioning markets 
exist? In a similar vein, what is the advantage of favouring long-term supply contracts if there 
is a spot market that allows efficient arbitrage? 
 
Our analysis starts with a few characterizations of the world oil market and then surveys 
standard  economic  reasons  for  acquiring  property  titles  or  for  signing  up  to  long-  term 
contracts. These economic rationalizations are then applied to concrete objectives China or 
respectively  the  Chinese  companies,  most  of  them  national  companies,  pursue  and  how 
much  that  makes  sense.  Given  the  opaqueness  and  difficulty  of  quantifying  the 
consequences of these Chinese undertakings, a simple demand model is calibrated using 
published elasticity estimates and forecasts. Using this framework projections are made, the 
consequences of Chinese oil demand on global demand, supply and market clearing prices 
are  computed,  and  the  consequences  of  supply  disruptions  are  studied.  A  final  section 
discusses a few other quantitative approaches that could be the subject of future research.  
 
3.1.1 The oil market - characteristics and history 
The first and most important characteristic of the world oil market is that one can indeed 
speak of a global oil market, i.e., a common pool from which all consumers may buy and into 
which all suppliers may sell, thus leading to ‘one oil price’ through arbitrage
72. This is not the 
case with other energy products. Cross-border trade in electricity is very limited and large 
price  differences  between  countries  can  persist  and  sustain  themselves.  Natural  gas 
markets,  to  take  another  example,  are  strongly  fragmented  along  regional  lines
73.  The 
situation of crude oil is, from one point of view, a seeming paradox. Physically speaking it is a 
                                                 
72 Of course, prices do differ between different types of crudes but those differences are relatively minor and 
reflect location – Brent is closer to the market (here in Western Europe) than Arab Light – as well as quality 
(gravity, the lighter the better, and sulphur content, the less the better). 
73  LNG  notwithstanding,  arbitrage  between  national  markets  is  very  limited,  allowing  very  different  price 
formation patterns, e.g. between European countries and North America, see Anderson (2008).  
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less  homogeneous  commodity  than  electricity  or  even  natural  gas.  From  the  economic 
perspective however, the crucial issue is the extent to which arbitrage can operate, and the 
latter can only be effective at the global level if trade, and therefore transportation, is possible 
and  relatively  cheap.  In  this  respect,  the  safety  and  cost-effectiveness  of  sea-bound 
transportation of oil is the key enabler. 
 
The history of the oil market has seen different price arrangements (in chronological order): 
 
·  Posted prices: Prices were posted as reference for the tax revenues (plus royalties) 
to be paid by the major oil companies. This system was in place until 1973 and 
although OPEC was founded in the sixties, it could only moderately increase the 
posted  price  until  the  Yom-Kippur  war.  This  system  was  clearly  favouring  the 
oligopoly of the seven sisters that controlled the entire supply chain from the field to 
the pump.  
·  The  OPEC  reference  price  (based  on  Arab  Light  with  its  up  to  5mb/d  providing 
something  like  a  residual  resource).  This  turned  the  tables,  favouring  the  OPEC 
oligopoly as a whole, but working at the expense of Saudi Arabia upholding the price. 
The system was brought down by Saudi Arabia in 1986.  
·  Netback pricing. Crude oil price deals were based on realised prices of petroleum 
products  on  established  spot  markets  (such  as  Rotterdam,  Singapore  and  New 
York). This was disliked by OPEC as it led to low crude prices.  
·  Market-related pricing (the current system), which is related to the reference crudes 
WTI, Brent und Dubai.  
 
Given the acknowledged imperfections of all these systems, it is obvious that they can only 
prevail if it suits the interests of crucial participants. Mabro (2005) describes the situation as 
follows: “The determination of oil prices in the current regime involves complex relationships 
between the market and OPEC. To put it more precisely, a key determinant of prices relates 
to the ways in which OPEC signals to the market and the ways in which the market receives, 
interprets and responds to these signals.”  
 
The Spot Market 
The original functioning and creation of the spot market was (and to some extent still is) to 
swap the mismatch of either of volume (too high or too low) or quality (say lighter crudes to 
meet high gasoline demand as in the US) between contracted crudes and product demand.  
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The reason is that prior to 1973, the international oil companies ran an integrated network 
from the oil fields to the gas pump, as mentioned above. After 1973 and the subsequent 
nationalization  of  the  oil  reserves  in  most  oil  producing  countries,  the  establishment  of 
independent  freight  and  refining  business,  the  power  of  the  International  Oil  Companies 
(IOCs)  was  broken.  As  a  consequence,  long-term  contracts  replaced  partially  (but  not 
completely) the former control of supply. In parallel, the share of crude acquired on the spot 
market increased. Furthermore, the system of official OPEC crude oil price (a price for the 
marker, Arab Light, and a differential based on quality (API gravity), sulphur and location) 
was the reference for trades in the spot market, sometimes the spot market ‘leading’ the 
official prices such as during the Iranian revolution. The spot prices are actually ‘made’ by 
information companies, first Platts and Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, which report (or at 
least claim to report) on actual transactions in different markets. One of the main problems of 
this spot market was and is that very little actual trading occurs which makes the process of 
price discovery very difficult. In particular, in the last few years there have been some serious 
doubts  about  the  ability  of  the  physical  spot  market  to  generate  a  price  that  reflects 
accurately the margin of the physical barrel of oil. However as a matter of fact (and enforced 
by the law of no arbitrage), the contract prices are linked to the spot prices. And any discount 
should be close to zero, because otherwise the buyer could sign a long-term contract and 
resell on the spot market for a profit. Conversely, oil offered at a higher price than the spot 
price should logically not find any buyers at all.  
 
The Futures Market 
At the moment, three crudes are traded on merchandise exchanges:  
 
·  Brent (actually, Brent, Forties, Oseberg and Ekofisk, BFOE) 
·  Western Texas Intermediate (WTI) 
·  Dubai 
 
All of the above have a rather marginal contribution (in particular Dubai) but nevertheless 
serve as markers after Saudi Arabia and OPEC stopped posting a reference price for its 
reference crude Arab Light. Nearly all oil traded outside America and the Far East is priced 
using Brent as a benchmark. WTI is the main benchmark used for pricing oil imports into the 
US. Dubai-Oman is used as a benchmark for Gulf crudes (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, the UAE, 
Qatar and Kuwait) sold in the Asia-Pacific market.   
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Let us have a closer look at Brent futures (following Varma, 2008). This is a deliverable 
contract based on EFP delivery with an option to cash settle as explained in the contract 
specifications:  the  ICE  Futures  Brent  Index  “is  the  weighted  average  of  the  prices  of  all 
confirmed  21-day  BFOE  deals  throughout  the  previous  trading  day  for  the  appropriate 
delivery months.” Essentially, therefore, the underlying for the Brent futures is the cash (21 
day) BFOE market. From the lack of a ‘money pump’ it follows that the futures price cannot 
deviate too much from this underlying ‘spot’ price. Now the Brent contract is used to price 
over 65% of the world’s traded crude oil although BFOE is only a miniscule part of the total 
crude  oil  production  in  the  world  and  far  more  important  and  influential  than  any  of  the 
markets for physical crude. 
 
The current price regime 
Following  Mabro  (2005),  the  current  oil  price  determination  system  can  be  described  as 
follows. The marker prices are determined in two futures exchanges: NYMEX in New York 
and IPE in London.  OPEC attempts to influence price by signalling its price preferences, by 
altering the level of its policy-determined production ceiling (and the associated production 
quotas). Those that buy or sell futures contracts may or may not respond to the signals. A 
positive market response to an OPEC (production) signal depends on how credible (that is 
how realistic) the OPEC policy decision appears to be. The nature of the responses also 
depends on whether the market is taken by surprise by the policy decision or whether it had 
widely expected it and therefore fully discounted it in the price.  
 
There is, however, a further important point. An OPEC decision on production is one, among 
several factors, that exercises an influence on the market. It often carries much weight but 
can be neutralised in certain instances by other factors if those are sufficiently powerful. In 
other words the general market context is of significance and it is always essential to assess 
an OPEC policy decision within its broader context, not in isolation.  
 
Both OPEC and the market continually assess the world petroleum situation, i.e., the likely 
future movements in supply and demand. Ironically, an organisation whose main policy is an 
oil production programme (OPEC) with an overall ceiling and individual quotas, bases this 
policy  on  data  provided  by  'secondary  sources'  and  not  from  the  member  countries 
themselves.  And  finally  inventories  are  crucial  and  based  on  the  weekly  data  on  US  oil 
inventories produced by the American Petroleum Institute and the US Department of Energy. 
With the oil price collapse in 1986 due to Saudi Arabia opening the valves of its oil fields after 
its output collapsed from above 10 mb/d to 3.6 mb/d (in 1985) and the subsequent switch  
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from  a  price-to-production  or  quota  strategy  of  OPEC,  market  quotations  became  the  oil 
price. With the loss of the marker crude Arab Light, the role of crudes for which organized 
exchanges exist increasingly filled the void of a reference price.  
The  narrowness  of  the  spot  market  and  the  perceived  inadequacies  of  the  spot  market 
(vulnerable to manipulation as already indicated) caused many oil-exporting and consuming 
countries to look for an alternative. A futures price is determined by actual transactions in the 
futures exchanges and not on the basis of some assessed prices by oil reporting agencies. 
Furthermore,  the  timely  availability  of  futures  prices  enhances  price  transparency.  The 
volume of daily transactions and open positions is additional useful information to gauge the 
liquidity of the market. Formula pricing constitutes the basis of the current international oil 
pricing regime. The formula used in pricing oil is straightforward: the price of a certain variety 
of crude oil is set as a differential to a certain marker or reference price. The most important 
element of formula pricing is the identification of the reference or benchmark crude. Brent, 
WTI and Dubai-Oman are the main crude oil benchmarks of the current oil pricing system. 
Nearly all oil traded outside America and the Far East is priced using Brent as a benchmark. 
WTI is the main benchmark used for pricing oil imports into the US. Dubai-Oman is used as a 




Petroleum inventories can serve the following purposes:  
 
1.  Inventories  of  crude  oil  are  readily  available  to  refineries  (petroleum  product 
manufacturers) for production of products such as gasoline and distillate heating oil, 
and inventories of primary petroleum products are readily available to be sold to end 
users.  
2.  Inventories are needed to cushion a system that delivers products in batches.  
3.  Companies  build  or  draw  down  discretionary  inventories  based  on  their  price 
expectations and sale opportunities.  
4.  Inventories provide a convenience yield as explained above.  
 
And since stocks can provide the marginal barrel either releasing or via the need to build, 
they can have a significant influence on oil prices. Of course, inventories also build or fall due 
to uncertainties or unexpected changes in production and demand.   
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3.1.2 Upstream investments with ownership rights 
 
A property right allows the owner to decide about all issues that are not specified in the 
contracts that govern the business transactions, i.e. to take (or keep) ‘residual rights’, see 
Hart  (1995).  That  is,  in  a  world  with  incomplete  contracts,  the  owner  can  fill  the  gaps 
according his own needs. In the case of ‘owning’ an oil field with, say, an average production 
of 100,000 b/d compared with a contract for delivery of 100,000 b/d is that the control over 
the  oil  field  allows  to  extract  extra  barrels  in  case  of  tight  supply  or  even  shortages,  or 
conversely to lower output in case of a glut, or to be able to extract when contracts are not 
honoured due to an embargo or other forms of political turmoil (i.e. the latter operates like an 
inventory, but below ground).  
 
In the absence of severe security crises (embargo, blockade, war, civil war or revolution), the 
ability  for  a  consuming  country  to  adjust  production  abroad  to  better  fit  current  market 
conditions  would  be  an  advantage.  However  the  same  outcome  can  theoretically  be 
achieved by holding inventories at home and by combining that safety margin with financial 
hedging using futures contracts. That said, one could also argue that the latter does not 
exclude the former, and that both types of security arrangements can work towards the same 
goal.  The  question  remains,  however,  as  to  whether  upstream  residual  rights  lead  to 
intrinsically  different  and  intrinsically  favourable  outcomes  for  the  home  (net  importer) 
country.  
 
In case of severe security crises, the kind of arrangement which would in theory be required 
is neither politically feasible nor politically desirable, e.g. full ownership and control over large 
fields in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran or Russia. Producing countries, for their part, 
are  naturally  reluctant  to  cede  residual  rights to  foreign  investors for both  economic  and 
security reasons. As a result, and as was illustrated by the examples from Chapter 1 of this 
report,  China’s  foreign  upstream  investments  typically  involve  limited  ownership  rights  (if 
any),  particularly  where  more  mature  and  larger  producers  are  concerned.  On  the  other 
hand, Chinese (or for that matter Western) leverage over minor emerging producers can be 
relatively high, but the resulting gain in terms of supply guarantees (if one assumes that such 
are  achieved)  is  small  compared  to  the  impact  on  world  prices  which  more  established 
producers can have. Of course, this is not to say that import dependent nations should do 
nothing. The question is rather whether upstream ownership makes economic sense from a 
security of supply perspective if one focuses strictly on short-term physical availability of oil 
and if one assumes normal relations between net importer and net exporter states.  
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Another  motivation  for  upstream  ownership  stakes  is  as  a  long-term  insurance  against 
unanticipated high oil prices. Hence, one is willing to pay prices for ownership of fields that 
are above expected levels in order to be insured against higher than expected future prices. 
Foreign investors are typically entitled to what is called equity oil (with all the caveats of 
course).  The  host  country  retains  the  bulk  of  the  output,  typically  80%  although  weaker 
governments may accept up to 65-35 split. In this case the investor, in our case China, gets 
for example 20% of the output from which it has to pay taxes and royalties. This provides 
somewhat reliable supply and a financial hedge since the investor (China) owns a share of 
the output. However even this entitlement to crude oil is less certain than appears on paper. 
The reason is that substantial gains for the contractor will attract domestic politicians and 
rent-seekers to renegotiate the favorable terms (of course, favorable from a pure ex-post 
perspective).  Recent  examples  include  the  nationalization  of  the  Petrobras  gas  fields  in 
Bolivia, the forced sale of Shell’s share to Gazprom from the joint operation in Sakhalin and 
the progressive elbowing-out of BP from its joint venture with TNK in Russia. Furthermore, 
the amount of financial hedge can be substantially diminished by ex-post negotiations if the 
terms appear ex-post as too favourable for the investor from the point of view of the host 
government. This phenomenon has been widely observed, even in traditionally law-abiding 
countries like the UK, where even a Conservative government lowered pre-contracted price 
caps after observing higher-than-expected profits. (The subsequent Labour government went 
further of course, and introduced, ex-post, a windfall tax on past profits.) Of course, these 
degrees of possible ex-post exploitation differ: owning an oil field in Texas will be less risky to 
this kind of ex-post expropriation than an oil field in Russia or Venezuela. On the other hand, 
a big country like China may have leverage over small developing countries as mentioned 
earlier, particularly if ‘package deals’ are used.  
 
3.1.3 Upstream investments without ownership rights 
Convenience yield 
Holding physical barrels either as an inventory above (i.e., conventional inventory and the 
corresponding section on inventories) or below the ground (i.e., property or more precisely, 
control rights on extraction) can provide an additional so called convenience yield, which is a 
little bit a slippery concept. However, most of the following convenience characteristics apply, 
strictly speaking, only to inventories since they are the only ones than can be used quickly. 
Hence,  this  yield  is  of  only  tangential  relevance  to  the  objective  of this  investigation.  Oil 
inventories provide convenience (beyond capital gains) to at least some inventory holders 
(otherwise no one would hold them). Finch (2005) lists the following:   
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·  The Marginal Convenience Yield is the convenience gained from holding an extra 
barrel of inventories; 
·  The Net Marginal Convenience Yield is the marginal convenience yield net of physical 
holding costs; 
·  The  Percentage  Net  Marginal  Convenience  Yield  is  the  net marginal  convenience 
yield divided by the spot price of the commodity. 
  
Because the marginal convenience from holding an added barrel of oil typically outweighs 
the physical cost of holding that extra barrel, those who buy inventories are in effect buying a 
“dividend stream” of future convenience yield. This stream of additional benefits causes the 
price of oil, like the price of dividend-bearing stocks, to increase more slowly than the overall 
required  return.  As  a  result,  the  expected  long-run  growth  of  oil  prices  is  less  than  as 
predicted by Hotelling’s rule. 
 
Supply side politics 
Another economic rationale could be that China sees these upstream involvements as a part 
of an optimal energy supply portfolio. Actually, China’s intention goes beyond that in the 
sense that it simply scared about the security and reliability of its energy and in particular oil 
supplies that are needed for its breath taking development. This point of view may appear 
paranoid, but given the political turmoils affecting crude oil markets, not entirely. One may 
add that the expansion of future global oil production may be modest and that further and 
substantial oil fields, let alone the option of owning them, are rare. Hence, one might foresee 
stronger competition about future supplies and controlling some of them (but how?) may 
prove  vital  in  particular  for  a  country  like  China  with  substantial  increases  in  demand, 
compared with the rather flat oil demand in the old industrialized world.  
 
3.1.4 Long-term supply contracts 
 
Seller and buyer relationships can operate according to various modes, e.g. 
·  At arm’s length on the spot market 
·  With long-term contracts = a contract where signing date and delivery date(s) are 
different.  
·  Clusters 
·  Vertical integration 
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The reasons for designing and signing long-term contracts can be quite different, e.g.:  
·  To insure specific investments, e.g., for pipelines in natural gas markets 
·  To lower transaction costs (in the narrow sense) 
·  To allocate risk: the risk averse party is willing to pay (accept) a constant contract 
price above (below) the expected price as an insurance against price uncertainty and 
volatility.  
·  To screen contract partners  
 
The  accruable  potential  benefits  from  long-term  contracts  depend  on  the  details.  For 
example, a long-term contract linked to market prices – either following the netback scheme 
of the late 1980s or the spot or even futures prices – will not provide a hedge against oil price 
volatility. In contrast, a fixed-price contract would ensure the buyer against oil price volatility. 
However  the  existence  of  such  arrangements  is  not  documented  in  publicly  available 
literature and they should in principle be very infrequent due to arbitrage possibilities. Long-
term supply contracts with a price that essentially tracks the spot price should therefore be 
the most frequent option. Chapter 1 of this report documents some cases of long-term supply 
contracts  between  China  and  some  of  its  partners.  Those  examples  suggest  that  such 
arrangements  occur  especially  if  they  are  ‘packaged’  together  with  other  commercial  or 
financial benefits.  
 
In the general case, however, arbitrage means that any contractual discount should be small 
(or zero), because otherwise the buyer would sign up to a long-term contract and resell on 
the spot market for a profit while the producer would be deliberately forgoing future income. 
That type of scenario seems very unlikely, except for special favours ‘among political friends’ 
(e.g.  Chavez  to  Cuba).  If fixed-price  contracts  were  to  occur,  they  would  furthermore  be 
subject to ex-post opportunism especially if prices go far beyond the contracted level, e.g. 
due  to  a  shortage  or  a  crisis.  In  such  a  situation,  the  supplier  may  try  to  ask  for  extra 
remuneration  to  compensate  for  ‘lossed  earnings’.  In  a  more  hard-headed  version,  the 
supplier  may  resort  to  various  tactics  such  as  delaying  or  reducing  shipments  due  to 
‘technical problems’. In turn this raises the question of why long-term contracts exist at all in 
the specific case of oil. In the extreme case, assuming that the price is exactly the same as 
the spot price, what are the advantages of a long-term oil supply contract? 
 
One rational explanation for long-term oil supply contracts with take-or-pay clauses and spot 
pricing can be posited if transportation costs are taken into account; for instance, a supplier 
may invest in an oil pipeline, and may wish to ensure that the utilisation rate of the pipeline  
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will remain within a certain range so as to ensure cost-effective and technically acceptable 
use of the pipeline; in this latter case it is not the price that matters, but the stability in terms 
of production and transportation costs that arise from fixing the quantities far into the future. 
Another advantage of a long-term contract with strategic suppliers is that is easier to get 
marginal barrels, or to cancel them. Outside of such a relationship a supplier would typically 
charge a premium for extra barrels; a long-term relationship may reduce that problem. 
 
 
3.2 Quantitative assessments of the impact of China’s oil demand 
 
In the following sections we present three approaches from the energy economics literature 
which can be applied to analyse the impact of China’s oil demand growth on the global oil 
market and on oil prices.  
 
 
3.2.1 Resource models 
One approach is to consider a standard demand resource model (based on OPEC exports) 
and how the resource price changes due to an increase in the trend. This may be crucial, 
despite all the critiques aimed at the Hotelling-type models, since according to Jeroen van 
der Mer
74, retired CEO of Shell, ‘prices are increasingly dictated by long-term assessments of 
demand and supply, rather than current market fundamentals.’ Therefore, he advises a long-
term view. However there is no market that explicitly trades on this long-term perspective. 
There are however some indirect channels. Trading of shares of oil companies is one of 
them. Another is that a perception of higher future prices encourages a more conservative 
OPEC extraction policy (to save oil in the ground for the more profitable future, see the quote 
of Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah below) impacting already on today’s price. In any case, "the 
$140/barrel price in the summer of 2008 and the $60/barrel in November of 2008 could not 
both  be  consistent  with  the  same  calculation  of  a  scarcity  rent  warranted  by  long-term 
fundamentals" according to Hamilton (2008).  
Starting point is oil cartel that chooses its extraction, or equivalently its price policy {p(t), 0 ≤ t 
≤  T}  and  the  depletion  date  T,  by  maximizing  its  net  present  value  of  profits  (using  the 
constant discount rate r > 0) 
                                                 
74 From Jad Mouawad, Wild Swings in the Price of Oil Jeopardize Economic Recovery, in The New York Times 
taken from Der Standard, 20
th of July 2009.   
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dt t x t p e
0 , max                   (1) 
subject to the laws of demand: 
x(t) = D(p(t), t) = f(t) - ap(t)                  (2) 
 
where D is the demand function, which is assumed for simplicity to be linear, and p(t) is the 
price in period t, more precisely price net of costs since costs are ignored and its resource 
constraint (R denotes the resource volume available for sales).  




.                    (3) 
The solution of this simple variant of the model of Hotelling (1931) is well known: marginal 
revenues must grow at the rate of interest, with an explicit analytical solution except for the 
depletion date, T, which should be determined numerically (e.g. using Newton-Raphson).   
Of  course,  testing  this  hypothesis  depends  on  the  numbers  that  one  uses.  For  example 
consider the ‘monopoly’ of the Gulf exporters; a similar result holds for total OPEC. Using the 
calibrated  demand  relation  (in  billion  barrels  per  annum)  with  exponential  growth  (similar 
results hold for linear growth) shown in (4): 
 
xt = 8.70egt – 0.0435pt  (t = 0 corresponds to 2010)          (4) 
 
pt is the real crude oil price (in 2008-$) in period t. We use a low and a high growth rate: g = 
2.8% (= average 2000/1990) and g = 3.5% (annual) to trace the consequences of higher 
demand  growth.  This  growth  is  slightly  higher  than  the  one  implied  by  the  GDP  growth 
assumptions in Table 3 (3% annual, globally) and the income elasticities in Table 1, which 
would imply a growth of around 2.4%. The remaining assumptions are: a low discount rate of 
r = 5% (annual) which we assume are used by the Gulf countries somewhat reflecting the 
quote of King Abdullah; and the availability of R = 500 billion barrels for exports from a given 
proven  reserve  base  of  above  700  billion  barrels  (BP,  2009);  using  a  higher  reserve 
assumption diminishes the relatively meagre short-run effect even further.  
Fig. 3.1 shows the implications of the higher growth path. Prices start very close to a value of 
above $100/bl (= calibrated static monopoly price) thus the short-run effect of this higher 
growth is small, but grows then significantly over time. From the point of view of the net 
present value, the higher growth rate increases the value of an additional barrel (extracted 


















Note: based on equation (4) and assuming r = .05, R = 500 and g as indicated. 
 
 
3.2.2 Market clearing approach (static) 
Another way to look at the consequences from China’s (and others’) future oil demand is to 
sketch how expected growth in demand and likely supply determine market clearing price 
levels making some sensible assumptions about income and price elasticities. Of course 
these back of the envelope calculations exclude all major structural changes in demand, e.g., 
severe restrictions due to global warming that are accepted at a global level, which is not 
very likely, compare Mitrova (2009) on Russia and Zhang (2009) on China.  
 
A common rule of thumb concerning aggregate energy demand is that income elasticities are 
around 1. One may actually put them above 1 for a number of developing countries and 
slightly below 1 (maybe) for industrialized countries due to structural changes (their output is 
getting ‘lighter’). Indeed, even if empirically estimated elasticities are lower then this may be 
due not to the underlying demand but may capture the improvements in energy efficiencies 
during the last decades, most of which were triggered by past price increases or high prices.  
Ignoring issues of asymmetry across price jumps up and down (compare e.g., Wirl (1988) 
and Walker and Wirl, 1993), a long run elasticity of final energy prices is around 0.5, i.e. it 
takes 2% real increase to lower demand by 1% (ceteris paribus).  
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Now oil is only a part of the total energy demand picture and due to inter-fuel substitution 
final oil price elasticity may be larger. This works in the opposite direction at the primary 
level, i.e. at the level of crude oil prices, where the elasticity will be much lower due to the 
substantial and additive tax components, e.g. above 50% on gasoline in European countries. 
Furthermore, oil is today in the industrialized world primarily a transport fuel only. Hence, 
inter-fuel substitution is almost gone such that the oil price elasticity assumed below in Table 
3.1 seems quite optimistic about real demand flexibility. And since it is restricted to transport, 
the  income  elasticity  will  be  above  average  (and  may  be  even  above  1  considering  the 
growth in air travel). Developing and other countries are generally less price-elastic at the 
level of final prices but face lower taxes (or are even subsidized) and have more scope for 
fuel substitution. The elasticities shown in Table 3.1 are taken from a recent investigation of 
Dargay, Gately and Huntington (2008) that is documented in more detail in the Appendix. An 
interesting feature is that the income elasticities for oil are across the regions below 1 despite 
transport  demand  being  often  a  superior  service.  And  this fact  explains  the  high  income 
elasticity in the OECD where oil is almost reduced to a transport fuel. In the Appendix one 
finds  slightly  different  assumptions  about  these  elasticities,  which  end  up  in  markedly 
different outcomes in particular about the market clearing oil price level (significantly higher 
prices result). This exercise in the Appendix stresses the uncertainty of future oil prices even 
ignoring any political factors. Although Dargay, Gately and Huntington (2008) find no price 
elasticity  for  China  and  the  former  Soviet  Union  and  the  oil  exporters,  the  table  below 
assumes at least some price responsiveness in these regions too. One potential source is 
the huge amount of subsidies developing countries including China spend on fuels, see Fig. 
3.2.  This  is  clearly  unsustainable,  and  ‘if  something  cannot  go  on  forever,  it  will  stop’ 
according to Herb Stein. Assuming that China and most other developing countries solve this 
problem (a strong assumption), this can be reflected by increasing the oil price elasticity (or 
by reducing the income elasticity). With these modifications in mind the above assumptions 
about elasticities are our best guesses and used for simulating the impact of Chinese policies 
on global oil markets.  
 
In our opinion, the recent projections which are used to calibrate the model downplay the 
demand pressures if the availability of oil supply growth is indeed in the order of 1% per 
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Figure 3.2 









Table 3.1  
 
Basic Assumptions about income (GDP) and price elasticities for oil demand 
   Income elasticity  Oil price elasticity 
OECD  0.90  0.40 
China  0.80  0.20 
Russia + trans.  0.70  0.15 
Dev. countries  0.70  0.20 
 
Major recent forecasts, notably from the IEA, from OPEC and from Fesharaki (2009), agree 
(almost suspiciously in our opinion) on 1% annual growth in oil demand rising to around 105 
million  barrels  per  day  by  2030,  see  Table  3.2.  One  could  debate  the  likelihood  of  that 
demand level occurring. However we decide, in the present simulation exercise, to take it as 










Recent Oil Demand Projections for 2030 (mb/d) 
  2008  OPEC 2009  growth/a  IEA 2008  growth/a 
OECD  47.3  43.4  -0.4%  44.8  -0.2% 
China  8.0  15.9  3.2%  17.0  3.5% 
Russia + trans.  5.1  6.1  0.8%  6.1  0.8% 
Dev. Countries  24.1  40.2  2.4%  36.1  1.9% 




Assumptions about economic growth (avg. 2008-2030) 
OECD  1.7% 
China  6.3% 
Russia + transition  2.3% 
Dev. Countries  4.0% 
World  3.0% 
Source: OPEC World Oil Outlook 2009. 
 
We assume the elasticities given in Table 3.1 and the economic growth rates given in Table 
3.3.  Moreover  we  assume  that  the  price  in  2008  (94  USD/bl)  was  a  temporary  out-of-
equilibrium price. Instead we assume that the demand level observed in 2008 is consistent 
with an equilibrium price of 60 USD / bl. Based on these assumptions, we constrain global oil 
demand at 105.6 mb/d in 2030 and solve for the regional demands and the equilibrium price. 
We find a solution for the equilibrium price in 2030 of 164 USD/bl (at 2008 prices), i.e. an 
increase of 74%, or 2.5% per year, in real terms, from 2008 to 2030.  
 
The  vector  of  solutions  for  demand  by  world  region  is  given  in  Table  3.4.  The  major 
difference with recently published scenarios is the higher projection for Chinese oil demand: 
19 mb/d compared with, e.g., 16.3 mb/d in IEA (2009: 81). This stresses two points: first, the 
central position of China; second, the substantial sensitivity of such projections which are 
necessarily based on parameters that are only rudimentarily known. 
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What  are  the  consequences  of  higher  growth  in  China,  say  7%  instead  of  the  assumed 
6.3%? In this case we find a market-clearing price in 2030 of 177 USD/bl (at 2008 prices), 




Projection for 2030 (mb/d)  
  2008  2030 
OECD  47.3  44.2 
China  8.0  19.2 
Russia + trans. Econ.  5.1  6.2 
Dev. Countries  24.1  36.0 
World  84.5  105.6 
Note: based on the following assumptions: elasticities from Table 3.1, GDP growth according to  




























Furthermore, the composition of world oil demand would change raising China’s share from 
18% to 20% compared with below 10% in 2008. However, not everything must go in this 
pessimistic direction. If, as Zhang (2009) claims, ‘Chinese investments in oil fields in African 
countries help to pump more oil out of the fields and enlarge the overall availability of oil on 
the world market’ then these Chinese involvements may mitigate future demand pressure. If 
we assume that these Chinese investments trigger an increase in oil supply by around 1% or 
1 mb/d, what are the consequences? The effect is in fact very limited: it would lower the price 
in  2030  by  around  3%  (to  159  USD/bl)  with  of  course  insignificant  effects  on  the  global 
demand pattern. 
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3.2.3 Sluggish demand framework and supply disruptions 
The above scenarios ignore short-run effects by assuming that consumers move along their 
equilibrium demand path perceiving a smooth price evolution in line with the given growth 
rates (at 2.5% per annum in real terms). This assumption is of course unrealistic given the 
sluggishness of demand and the less-than-perfect foresight of consumers. Rather than re-
simulating the entire demand, supply and price paths, the following analysis considers the 
short-run effect of a supply disruption when consumers and other suppliers react sluggishly 
to this unforeseen effect. This can be used to address the issue of a supply shock or of the 
effect of hitting a peak in oil production. For this purpose, we assume the same long-run 
income and price elasticities from Table 3.1. Furthermore, we assume that demand reacts to 
income  instantaneously  since  higher  output  requires  more  inputs  immediately,  ceteris 
paribus. However we ignore how oil prices affect GDP growth. In contrast, the reactions to 
prices are sluggish (and symmetric) with a time constant of demand adjustment of 5 years 
(the ‘lag’ parameter is then 0.8333…), which one may consider as fairly optimistic given the 
lifetimes  of  energy-consuming  devices,  e.g.  over  10  years for  cars  and  many  appliances 
(heating), 50 years and more for buildings.  
 
Let us assume, therefore, that a revolution in Saudi Arabia wipes out its entire oil production 
(around 10 mb/d) for half a year, i.e., around 5 mb/d for the year as a whole. For the record 
and as a reminder: Iran’s Islamic revolution slashed output by about 75% from close to 6 
mb/d to below 1.5 mb/d in 1980, afterwards only slowly increasing (admittedly inhibited by 
the war with Iraq) and reaching 3 mb/d only in 1990 and 4 mb/d only in 2003. 
 
Table 3.5 
Short-run effects of 5 mb/d supply disruption 
  2008  No disruption   10 mb/d cut for 6 months 
OECD  47.3  49.3  45.8 
China  8.0  11.4  11.0 
Russia+  5.1  5.6  5.5 
Dev. Countries   24.1  28.8  27.7 
World  84.5  95.0  90.0 
USD / bl    73.0  220.0 
 
We assume furthermore that demand is 95 mb/d just before the crisis, which corresponds to 
an  equilibrium  demand  reached  8  years  from  now,  under  the  assumptions  used  in  our 
previous simulation exercise, with a corresponding equilibrium price of around 73 USD/bl.  
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What will this half-year disruption do to the average annual oil price? As indicated in Table 
3.5, we find an equilibrium price peak for the year of the crisis of 220 USD/bl. This result may 
arguably even underestimate the possible effect, given the real-time uncertainty about the 
length of the crisis during its occurrence, as well as given relatively long shipping times which 
we left out from our simulation. A longer crisis, e.g. taking Saudi Arabia’s output off for a 
whole  year,  would  surpass  any  commonly  understood  threshold:  our  calculations  yield  a 
price of 700 USD/bl, which we dare to report. Slight parameter variations can substantially 
aggravate such effects. For example doubling the time constant lets the price quintuple (on 
an annual basis, so the half-year effect would be much larger). In any case, our results lend 
strong support for hedging against such risks. 
 
Another  potential  question  to  ponder  for  oil  security  analysis  is  the  following.  Suppose 
China’s strategy of acquiring equity oil and having a diversified portfolio of suppliers would 
allow China to secure an additional 1 mb/d, off-market in a sense, during a crisis similar to 
the  one  simulated  earlier.  In  these  circumstances,  the  Chinese  economy  would  better 
withstand the shock than others who would have to make deep cuts in consumption. China 
would however face the opportunity costs, at 220 USD/bl, for using the equity oil instead of 
putting it on the spot market. 
 
Peak oil 
The  framework  sketched  earlier  could  also  be  used  to  investigate  a  peak  oil  scenario. 
Another  scenario  which  could  be  simulated  (and  which  we  find  would  be  an  interesting 
exercise for further research) would be to assume a deliberate reluctance of oil producers to 
expand output for strategic purposes. This lack of a corresponding economic motivation was 
raised in the simulations of Dermot Gately (2001, 2004), and was well expressed by Saudi 
Arabia’s King Abdullah in 2008, who said
75 he had ordered some new oil discoveries left 
untapped to preserve oil wealth in the world’s top exporter for future generations: ‘I keep no 
secret from you that when there were some new finds, I told them, ‘no, leave it in the ground, 
with grace from God, our children need it.’ 
 
                                                 
75 Saudi Press Agency, Reuters, 13 April, 2008.   
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In this final part of the report we provide an analytical framework for the assessment of the oil 
security position of a major net importer of oil, and then apply it to the case of China within 
the global context that seems to be emerging by 2020-2030. We start by a brief review of the 
concepts of energy security in general and of oil security in particular.  
 
4.2. Energy security and oil security 
 
Energy security in contemporary Western discourse can be defined as ‘the availability of 
energy at all times, in various forms, in sufficient quantities, and at affordable prices’, see 
Meidan (2007: 16). The International Energy Agency, for its part, suggests the following short 
formulation
76:  ‘the  uninterrupted  physical  availability  at  a  price  which  is  affordable,  while 
respecting environment concerns’. The IEA goes on to distinguish between long-term energy 
security, related to ‘timely investments to supply energy in line with economic developments 
and environmental needs’, and short-term energy security, related to ‘the ability of the energy 
system to react promptly to sudden changes in supply and demand’. 
 
In a sense, the inclusion of environmental sustainability goals, particularly with respect to 
greenhouse gas emissions, has made the analysis of and the discourse on energy security 
less clear. There is no doubt that climate change can affect energy supplies (e.g. due to a 
higher  occurrence  of  extreme  weather  events  which  may  damage  critical  energy 
infrastructure) as well as energy consumption patterns (at the very least due to temperature 
changes). It is also clear that energy and climate policies must be assessed and designed in 
concert. However energy security (and a fortiori oil security) is best analysed as a separate 
general policy target, alongside climate security. This is particularly relevant in the context of 
short-term energy security (e.g. how to deal with a sudden but short-lived supply disruption), 
as the time horizons involved are much too short for climate change to matter. In this report, 
therefore, the definition of Meidan (2007: 16) is preferred over the IEA definition.  
 
                                                 
76 http://www.iea.org/subjectqueries/keyresult.asp?KEYWORD_ID=4103 (accessed 15 December 2009)  
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Guaranteeing  uninterrupted  supplies  in  sufficient  quantities,  as  separate  from  what  price 
must be paid, is the next clarification which needs to be made, both for short and long time 
horizons. For short-term scenarios, one type of risk for the consumer is a physical supply 
disruption,  i.e.  due  to  accidental  breakdowns  of  infrastructure  or  uncontrollable  natural 
events, or due to hostile actions on the part of state or non-state actors. In that case, the 
energy product is not available in the usual quantity, regardless of how much the consumer 
is prepared to pay. The other main type of risk is a price spike which may occur as a result of 
a physical supply disruption, of abusive and abrupt use of market power on the part of a 
supplier, or of a spike in demand which leads to a price spike. As outlined in Chapter 3, the 
most damaging types of price spikes would come from shocks on the supply side rather than 
on  the  demand  side,  since,  e.g.,  a  major  upheaval  in  a  key  producing  country  or  a 
devastating terrorist attack on large elements of critical oil infrastructure could occur much 
more abruptly than a jump in demand. Concerning long-term energy security, the core risk 
would be an unexpected structural insufficiency of supply as compared to demand which 
may  lead  not  only  to  short-term  losses  but  to  a  prolonged  period  of  hardship  and  of 
(necessarily  slow)  re-adjustment  of  demand  patterns,  e.g.  a  peak  oil  scenario  which 
confounds the expectations of governments and industry. 
 
In the acute case most of all, and it is important to remember this, energy security is national 
security
77. This holds true for energy security in general, and for oil security in particular. The 
decisive issue with respect to crude oil is that it is a strategic commodity, i.e. it is:  
 
1.  Indispensable for core functions of modern economic systems (and national defence); 
2.  Not substitutable in the short-run (or even in the medium-run);  
3.  In insufficient supply in most states, while abundant in a few others. 
 
As aptly noted in Korin and Woolsey (2008), ‘the unique strategic importance of oil to the 
modern economy stems from the fact that oil has a virtual monopoly in the global economy’s 
very enabler — the transportation sector’. The latter statement effectively covers points 1 and 
2 of the definition proposed above. Point 3 of the definition naturally leads to the notion of 
asymmetric interdependence
78 (or power asymmetry) between states, in this case between 
net importers and net exporters of crude oil. 
 
                                                 
77 This exact statement is frequent in US political discourse, see e.g. the February 28, 2006 speech by Barack 
Obama bearing that title. 
78  See  Christie  and  Graetz  (2009)  for  a  (very)  compact  exposition  and  an  application  to  Europe-Russia 
asymmetry with respect to natural gas.  
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Assessing a country’s oil security position can be achieved in a number of ways. The most 
compact and yet still highly informative analytical exercise is to compute an oil vulnerability 
index  as  developed  for  instance  in  Gupta  (2008).  More  broadly,  the  notion  of  energy 
vulnerability is a natural complement of the notion of energy security and may be defined as: 
‘the extent to which adverse exogenous events with respect to a country’s energy supply 
system may detrimentally affect the welfare of the country’s population and/or the integrity of 
the State, its territory or its institutions’, see Christie (2009: 277). 
 
By  implication,  the  correct  approach  towards  assessing  a  country’s  oil  security  position 
consists in identifying the risks and threats to the country’s oil supplies and assessing the 
likelihood of their occurrence and the potential impact of their occurrence. In a second step, 
the  formulation  of  an  oil  security  policy  should  take  as  its  main  target  the  level  of  the 
country’s oil vulnerability, subject to other policy constraints (e.g. climate policy, industrial 
policy)  and  to  feasibility  constraints  (e.g.  economic,  political,  financial,  legal).  The  target 
variable chosen in this view is the level of vulnerability, i.e. it is not necessarily the case that 
vulnerability must always be reduced, that depends on the risks and threats at hand.  
 
As  mentioned,  the  simplest  assessments  are  based  on  the  computation  of  vulnerability 
indices. In that context a number of well-known concepts of energy security typically enter 
the  index  calculations  in  some  form.  Drawing  from  Gupta  (2008),  Gnansounou  (2008), 
Percebois (2007) and Vivoda (2009), and from the discussion thus far, the variables below 
may be considered (not listed in order of priority). 
 
1.  Oil import dependence ratio 
2.  Total oil imports 
3.  Oil intensity of the economy 
4.  Share and substitutability of petroleum products in transportation 
5.  Share and substitutability of petroleum products in other sectors 
6.  Domestically-held oil stocks 
7.  Diversity of import sources 
8.  Diversity of transit routes 
9.  Risks or threats with respect to supplier countries 
10. Risks or threats from third parties (e.g. transit countries, terrorist groups, other net 
importers of oil, other) 
11. Risks of accidental breakdowns and natural disasters 
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The oil import dependence ratio is quite an obvious choice. A net exporter (dependence 0%) 
can rely on domestic production to fulfil all domestic needs. We assume additionally that 
risks  and  threats  to  the  domestic  oil  industry  (if  there  is  one)  can  be  dealt  with  at  an 
acceptable cost, i.e. that the risks of domestic oil production are never so high that the best 
policy  would  be  to  shut  down  the  sector  altogether.  The  total  level  of  oil  imports  is  a 
complementary variable, though its effect may be ambiguous. In an acute situation, needing 
less oil from the world market in absolute terms may be an advantage, though negotiating 
power  may  be  lower.  The  oil  intensity  of  the  economy  reflects  (imperfectly  and  very 
generally)  the  extent  to  which  the  economy  can  function  with  less  or  no  oil.  This  is 
complemented  by  indicators  on  the  share  and  the  substitutability  of  oil  products  in 
transportation and in other sectors (e.g. for industry, for heating in the residential sector). An 
indicator of diversity of fuels in transportation is used in Gnansounou (2008), and it is to be 
seen  in  a  forward-looking  manner,  e.g.  with  respect  to  hybrid  and  electric  passenger 
vehicles, see for example the 450 Scenario assumptions in IEA (2009: 323). The role of 
domestic  stocks,  both  commercial  and  strategic,  is  intuitive  in  case  of  an  acute  supply 
shortfall. Broader linkages with respect to oil price formation are also in evidence for major 
consumers, see e.g. Kaufmann et al. (2008). 
 
4.2. Diversification, risks and threats 
Diversification is one of the cornerstones of energy security. On that topic, Winston Churchill 
reportedly remarked that: ‘the key to oil supply security is with diversity and diversity alone.’  
There are three types of diversity that are relevant for energy security: diversity of suppliers, 
diversity of routes, and diversity of fuels. Diversity of fuels is implicitly addressed by points (4) 
and (5) above. Concerning diversity of suppliers, one potential pitfall is the general idea that 
the more diversity there is, the better. This is of course not true in the general case, since the 
goal is to reduce overall risk, not maximise diversity per se. In other terms, being entirely 
dependent on one stable and reliable supplier may be safer than being dependent on two 
unstable  and  unreliable  suppliers  (especially  if their  actions  are  coordinated  or  otherwise 
correlated).  The  assessment  therefore  depends  on  the  risk  factors,  an  issue  which  is 
addressed in the literature by using political risk indicators. That approach is nevertheless 
incomplete, as it implies an omni-directional concept of country risk. The latter is sufficient if 
the only risk posed by the supplier is its own collapse, e.g. civil war, revolution. If the supplier 
uses its energy resources as a foreign policy instrument, then supplier actions (and risks) 
should  be  looked  at  on  a  bilateral  basis.  For  example,  a  supplier  may  deliberately  halt 
deliveries to a specific country. That type of risk should be assessed for each (target) country 
individually.  Fortunately,  today’s  global  oil  market  offers  a  set-up  in  which  diversity  of  
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suppliers (and solidarity between consumers) is achieved easily. As a result, the impact of a 
targeted bilateral oil supply cut is mostly spread throughout the world market. Unless the 
target country is in a landlocked and highly isolated region, alternative volumes of oil can 
usually be bought and delivered quite quickly from the spot market. 
The  issue  of  diversification  of  routes  should  also  be  assessed  within  a  risk  analysis 
framework, taking into account the costs and benefits of developing and maintaining new 
routes as compared to the risks and threats to existing routes. If the importer is an island, 
then everything will depend on the safety of sea-lanes. If the importer is land-locked, then 
more  than  one  overland  route  should  be  used  (if  cost-effective,  taking  the  likelihood  of 
disruptions into consideration). If the importer has a coastline but is not an island, then a 
combination of sea-bound and overland transit options seems sensible. 
We now turn to the main categories of risks and threats. In this context we follow the main 
categories defined in French Ministry of Defence (2008) by defining risks as adverse events 
that do not result from hostile intent, and by defining threats as those that do. Among risks, 
and focusing on short-term risks alone, one finds accidental breakdowns due to technical 
failures  and/or  human  error,  as  well  as  uncontrollable  natural  events.  The  most  relevant 
natural events with respect to oil security are extreme weather events which may be such as 
to damage or otherwise disable elements of oil infrastructure. Other short-run risks include 
price spikes which could occur for reasons not elsewhere classified (e.g. new information 
creates  panic  on  markets).  Longer-term  risks  may  be  taken  to  include  the  build-up  of 
unsustainable or vulnerable trends at home or abroad, e.g. stocks at a persistently low level, 
strongly increasing import dependence. Among threats one finds hostile acts on the part of 
State  and/or  non-State  actors  (e.g.  terrorist  groups)  who  may  target  critical  energy 
infrastructure. Long-term threats are more difficult to define. 
 
 
4.3. China’s oil security targets 
In the case of China the situation with respect to transit routes was sketched out in Chapter 1 
of this study: some oil resources are available from Russia and the Central Asian states and 
can be (or will be) brought to China by existing or new pipelines. In parallel, however, the 
bulk of China’s imported oil comes by sea, and an important share of that import flow goes 
through the Straits of Malacca. It is therefore useful to explore what risks and threats China 
may reasonably have in mind by looking at China’s actions under the assumption that those 
are ‘revealed energy security preferences’.  
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Shifting some of the oil transit away from the Straits of Malacca is a non-confrontational 
measure on the part of China to improve its oil security. Conceivable threats include large-
scale terrorist attacks, piracy, and naval blockades. Conceivable risks include major shipping 
accidents and/or extreme weather events. Like any major power, China has to base some of 
her security assessments on ‘worse-case scenarios’, while working towards preventing their 
occurrence, preferably in a non-threatening manner. In this context it is an open secret that 
one concern is a possible conflict with the United States (and perhaps some of its allies) over 
Taiwan, and that this could conceivably lead to the US Navy trying to interdict oil shipments 
to China. Since the Straits of Malacca are an obvious naval choke-point it stands to reason 
that the potential impact of such a scenario should be reduced. Concurrently, China’s interest 
in developing a more powerful ‘blue water’ navy is also discussed in the public domain. The 
latter would help to secure oil shipments in the face of any of the threats mentioned above, 
not only in the Straits of Malacca, but potentially further afield, e.g. in the Indian Ocean for 
both Middle Eastern and African oil. In parallel, Chinese interest in Eurasian resources that 
can be delivered by pipeline displace (in relative terms at least) some of the oil that it would 
otherwise import over the seas. In the Eurasian context, China’s broader relations with the 
region, e.g. within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), are complementary to her 
oil security goals. 
 
The considerations above, which are a direct application of the framework outlined in the 
previous sections, find some confirmation in the literature. Tønnesson and Kolås (2006: 19) 
cite a US assessment according to which Chinese policy-makers have three main (short-
term) oil security concerns: 
 
1.  Sudden disruptions in provision of oil to the global market could trigger serious energy 
shortages  and  sharp  price  spikes  that  would  have  severe  adverse  effects  on  the 
Chinese economy. 
2.  China might be affected by disruptions in tanker flows from unstable exporting regions 
such as the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and Africa. 
3.  Japan and the USA might attempt to deny China vital oil supplies in the event of a 
confrontation, particularly over Taiwan, due to US strategic dominance in the Persian 
Gulf and other key oil exporting regions, US naval control of critical transportation 
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4.4. China’s geopolitical fears: the US, the Middle East and Oil 
A recent and detailed CSIS report on the state of the ‘Vital Triangle’ made up of the US, 
China and the Middle East, reports that there is a ‘nearly universal belief in China that US 
policy in the Middle East is essentially about seizing control of that region’s oil in order to 
coerce countries dependent on that oil, as part of a drive for global domination’, see Alterman 
and Garver (2008: 12) (emphasis added). 
 
Many observers in many countries, including the US and other members of the ‘Coalition of 
the willing’ that invaded Iraq in 2003, have discussed the oil aspect of the Iraq War. Even 
before the war started, opponents used a simple catch-phrase: ‘it’s all about oil’. But in what 
way exactly was it ‘about’ oil? One possible interpretation was offered by Alan Greenspan
79 
in 2007, i.e. that: ‘Saddam, looking over his 30-year history, very clearly was giving evidence 
of  moving  towards  controlling  the  Straits  of  Hormuz,  where  there  are  17,  18,  19  million 
barrels a day’. As a result, Greenspan stated that he supported the overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein  for  reasons  of  US  (and  ultimately  global)  economic  security,  as  he  feared  that 
Saddam could, at some stage, deliberately disrupt oil exports in the region so as to generate 
a massive oil price spike (and earn money while crashing the world economy). Greenspan’s 
statement was rejected by US officials. However the vague notion of ‘securing oil supplies in 
the  region’  has  stuck,  without  any  clear  interpretation  as  to  what  ‘securing  oil  supplies’ 
actually means, and why whatever it does mean might be a good idea for the United States 
(and for the governments who supported the US decision). At the same time, few Western 
critics seem to share the Chinese interpretation that the US planned (or plans) to manipulate 
Middle Eastern oil exports in order to coerce other net importers, notably China, into making 
political or economic concessions. 
 
China’s  incomplete  line  of  reasoning  was  reported  in  a  milder  form  in  Washington  Post 
(2005) and is worth citing at length. In that article a number of Chinese scholars and other 
experts were interviewed. Pan Rui, an international relations expert at Fudan University in 
Shanghai, stated: ‘Iraq changed the [Chinese] government’s thinking […] The Middle East is 
China's  largest  source  of  oil.  America  is  now  pursuing  a  grand  strategy,  the  pursuit  of 
American hegemony in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is the number one oil producer, and 
Iraq is number two [in terms of reserves]. Now, the United States has direct influence in both 
countries.’ Zhu Feng, a security expert at Beijing University, stated: ‘Many people argue that 
oil interests are the driving force behind the Iraq war. For China, it has been a reminder and 
a warning about how geopolitical changes can affect its own energy interests. So China has 
                                                 
79 ‘Greenspan: Ouster of Hussein Crucial For Oil Security’, The Washington Post, 17 September 2007.  
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decided to focus much more intently to address its security.’ Tong Lixia, an energy expert at 
the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation stated: ‘The turning 
point in China's energy strategy was the Iraq war. After 2003, both the companies and the 
government realized China could not rely on one or two oil production areas. It's too risky.’ 
 
All in all, the Chinese leadership may have believed that the US was seeking hegemony over 
the Middle East, but another matter was whether the Chinese leadership believed that US 
hegemony over such a large region is at all possible. Barack Obama’s arrival in office in 
2009, and the access that Chinese NOCs have received to bid for Iraqi oil fields may have 
allayed the worst fears. On the other hand, a more moderate description of China’s views 
about oil security in the Middle East also appears through the cracks. As stated by Tong 
Lixia, the realisation was that relying too heavily on the Middle East is ‘too risky’ in general 
(which in recent years was certainly true). 
 
4.5. Actors, incentives and coordination 
China’s oil companies are state-owned, so one could think that China’s political leadership 
retains ultimate power over the NOCs (but may be reluctant to exercise that power in many 
cases). On the other hand, one could wonder whether the partial independence that Chinese 
NOCs seem to be increasingly acquiring is necessarily a problem for China. After all, oil 
companies in OECD countries that are net importers of oil are typically private joint-stock 
companies. Also, the ‘revolving door’ between government and oil companies is sometimes 
observed  in  OECD  countries  as  well  (most  strongly  under  the  Bush  Presidency).  An 
interesting question, therefore, is the extent to which China’s leadership may be deliberately 
allowing the NOCs to behave increasingly like independent private companies, while keeping 
some  options  for  political  leverage  in  case  things  go  wrong.  In  parallel  some  Chinese 
analysts,  e.g.  Dan  (2007),  argue  for  further  reforms  so  as  to  foster  more  competition  in 
China’s oil sector. In terms of China’s foreign oil policy, Downs (2007: 76) identifies examples 
of the NOCs pursuing ‘corporate objectives that do not always coincide with national policy 
priorities’. In particular, she highlights the case of competitive bidding between CNPC and 
Sinopec for pipeline projects in Sudan, and indicates that elements within China’s political 
leadership were displeased. The latter would prefer if Chinese NOCs worked ‘as a team’, at 
least abroad, for example by focusing on mutually-exclusive geographical regions so as to 
avoid direct competition.  
 
It is interesting to recall the restructuring process that was described in Chapter 1 of this 
report.  Essentially,  China’s  political  leadership  restructured  government  ministries  and  
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transformed  them  into  profit-seeking  (but  state-owned)  companies  while  keeping  strong 
individual links between government and the NOCs. If one takes this restructuring process at 
face-value,  then  it  is  not  surprising  if  China’s  NOCs  are  beginning  to  pursue  corporate 
objectives that do not necessarily coincide with national policy priorities. However the NOCs 
are state-owned, which means that the Politburo has some residual rights (and leverage) 
over what they do, just as surely as the oil industry has influence on government. 
 
The  opposite  stances  taken  by  Dan  (2007)  and  by  some  Politburo  members  suggest 
interesting  policy  futures.  If  China  liberalises  further,  e.g.  in  terms  of  creating  liquid  and 
transparent domestic markets for oil products, then this could further push the NOCs towards 
independence. On the other hand if the views of some Politburo members gain more traction, 
then China could end up trying to ‘have it both ways’, i.e. economic efficiency thanks to 
competition at home, but coordinated market-sharing activities abroad, as if China’s NOCs 
could behave like a single ‘national champion’ on the world stage, but compete at home.  
 
Catching-up with the West 
Several arguments as to why China’s NOCs are so keen to make upstream investments 
were  discussed  in  Chapter  3  of  this  report.  In  this  sub-section  a  rather  more  standard 
explanation is offered based on standard incentives. Simply put, China’s NOCs are profit-
seeking enterprises that are interested in upstream investments if they can get them. The 
political leadership could simply leave things at that, while pursuing liberalisation, and China 
would slowly start to resemble the United States more than any other country, i.e. a large, 
powerful country with substantial domestic oil production which is however far too low to 
cover demand, and with several large and ambitious oil companies that compete with each 
other and with other IOCs and NOCs for upstream investments in the world. 
 
However  China’s  political  leadership  actively  supports  and  encourages  foreign  upstream 
investments on the part of the NOCs and has developed a relatively standard view on oil 
security issues. As a result, one could argue that China’s political leadership is deliberately 
blowing wind into the sails of the NOCs to push them to make rather more acquisitions than 
they would otherwise commit to, and that this bias in favour of upstream investment is partly 
motivated  by  a  belief  that  such  investments  would  ‘lock  down’  resources  in  case  the 
international  situation  were  to  deteriorate  again  as  it  did  in  the  2003-2008  period.  The 
problem  with  this  interpretation  is  that  one  would  have  to  clarify  exactly  what  access  to 
resources is secured through those many deals that China’s NOCs have entered into. 
  




Over  the  last  two  decades  China  has  played  an  ever-increasing  role  in  the  massive 
expansion of global trade and investment flows and has grown from an economically under-
developed country to a major power. China’s impact on the world economy in general and on 
oil demand and oil prices is already large and is predicted to be considerable in future as 
outlined in Chapter 2. More broadly, some observers foresee that China could become a 
fully-fledged peer-competitor to the United States in most of the major dimensions of power 
by  mid-century.  The  structure  of  the  global  balance  of  power,  in  other  terms,  is  shifting. 
China’s rise to superpower status is not inevitable, though it is widely considered to be very 
likely.  Difficulties  and  delays  may  arise  for  China,  economically,  politically,  socially,  and 
environmentally. The adequate management of energy policy is a central challenge which 
China’s  leadership  will  have  to  solve.  Energy  efficiency  as  a  whole  will  have  to  improve 
considerably. Also, as pointed out in Chapter 3 of this study, oil market developments could 
turn out to be less favourable than the most recent scenarios from the International Energy 
Agency. As a result, and given her still very small passenger vehicle fleet, China may have a 
window of opportunity to try to achieve a relatively clean vehicle fleet sooner rather than 
later. Since China surely wishes to develop into a mature high-technology economy then 
road transportation could be a good place to start. 
 
Summing  up from  Chapters  1,  3  and  4,  the major  reasons for  China’s  engagement  and 
activity in international acquisitions of oil companies appear to be the following: 
  
1.  Fears about the future physical availability of oil as a crucial fuel for its development; 
2.  China’s companies are awash with cash and China’s NOCs are strongly incentivised 
to make upstream investments. 
 
Given  the  fears  in  (1)  and  the  incentives  in  (2),  it  is  no  surprise  that  (national)  Chinese 
companies continue to outbid others ignoring the winner’s curse, one of the first lessons in 
any course on auctions. But what are the consequences of this on oil markets? Given the 
(current) functioning of oil markets, i.e. the link of all oil contracts to market quotations (plus 
an adjustment) it is hard to see how shifts in ownership (which are anyway limited) could 
affect  future  oil  market  operations.  First  of  all  owners,  and  the  Chinese  companies 
presumably more than the host countries, will sooner or later realise the opportunity costs 
and thus behave economically. An issue of second order is the related expertise. On the one 
hand  one  may  argue  that  the  Chinese  participation  increases  the  efficiency  of  these  
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companies compared with purely national ones, on the other hand, these Chinese bids may 
win against even more competent oil companies.  
 
Therefore, the substantial effect on the future oil market is the demand pressure coming from 
China that despite its size may still be under-estimated by published forecasts. However, not 
everything must operate in this direction. For example Zhang (2009) claims that Chinese 
investments in oil fields in African countries will help to pump more oil such that these (costly) 
Chinese  involvements  provide  a  positive  externality  to  others.  It  may  be  questionable 
whether  this  Chinese  engagement  fosters  higher  output  compared  with,  say,  if  the 
international  oil  companies  do  it  with  all  their  know-how,  but  even  if  true,  this  effect  is 
presumably very small, at least according to our calculations.  
 
A broader lesson from this report is that there needs to be more engagement and more 
understanding between China and the United States in matters of oil security. By 2030 (at 
the  latest)  both  countries  will  have  very  similar  oil  import  needs  and  very  similar  import 
dependence ratios. As major consumers, China and the United States can understand each 
other’s needs, particularly if China chooses to move closer to a market-based view of the 
global oil market which would connect its domestic end-users to the world. The European 
Union and its member states have similar vulnerabilities and concerns as well. Unfortunately, 
EU member states have been reluctant to pool substantial sovereignty in matters of energy 
policy. EU states have lived for some time under the assumption that oil security issues could 
be left mostly to the Americans. With the arrival on the world stage of a new global power 
which  will  import  just  as  much  oil  as  the  US  by  2030,  the  oil  game  will  become  more 
complex. All three major consumers of tomorrow have an incentive, first, to avoid negative- 
sum or zero-sum competition for resources; second, to uphold a transparent global market 
with functioning arbitrage; and third, to work constructively together and with reference to the 
interests of oil producers towards a new transportation system which will no longer be based 
on petroleum products.  
 
In order to achieve this outcome, a new trilateral body should be created so as to enable 
regular  meetings  and  exchange  of  information  on  energy  trends  and  scenarios,  oil 
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Table A2: Oil demand elasticities from Hamilton (2008) 
 
 
 
 